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This thesis describes the development and validation of
a naval battle model which incorporates a tactical theory by
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. Opposing forces are portrayed
as aggregations of the staying power and combat power :f their
individual platforms. Attrition is modeled as a force-on-
force process and is expressed in terms of the degradation of
each force's combat power and staying power throughout the
engagement. User variation of model inputs concerning the
timing, direction and strength of each force's fire permits
analysis of the impact of scouting effectiveness and C2 on
battle dynamics.
Data from fourteen historical naval battles were gathered
to compute model input parameters for the opposing forces and
their interactions. The model's prediction of the outcome is
compared with each battle's actual outcome. The conclusion
drawn from this analysis is that the model is a fair
representation of reality.
The model's potential for practical application is
explored by using it to analyze the tactical options of the
U.S. commander at the World War II Battle of Savo Island.
Model results clearly indicate the weaknesses in U.S. tactics
in this battle and suggest alternative tactics which afforded
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I. INTRODUCTION
A naval battle model's purpose is to assist the tactical
planner in thinking about how best to employ his forces to win
a battle. To be useful, such a model must be able to handle
complex scenarios, be simple to implement and use, and produce
credible results. It must also be built upon assumptions
grounded in sound tactical theory.
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. has developed the theory upon
which a model can be built. He has summarized it in four
simple statements [Ref. 1]:
- Naval warfare is attrition centered. Attrition comes
from successful delivery of firepower.
- Scouting is a crucial and integral part of the
tactical process.
- Coituiana and control transform firepower and scouting
potential into delivered force upon the enemy.
- Naval combat is a force-on-force process involving, in
the threat or realization, the simultaneous attrition
of both sides. To achieve tactical victory, ene niist
attack effectively first.
While Hughes' theory has received wide acceptance, there has
never been an attempt to translate it into a model which can
assist naval officers in the planning of sound battle tactics.
A. ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A NAVAL BATTLE MODEL
A naval battle model must be characterized by simple
measures of the aggregate combat power and staying power of
the opposing forces as well as a means of expressing their
1
simultaneous attrition in battle. Additionally, the model
must afford the user the opportunity to vary inputs concerning
the allocation and deployment of platforms and the timing and
direction of fire. This allows the user to analyze the impact
of C2 and effective scouting on a battle's dynamics. These are
the characteristics of a model firmly grounded in Hughes'
tactical theory.
B. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING FORCE-ON-FORCE ATTRITION MODELS
Lanchester-type force-on-force attrition models portray a
battle with differential equations which represent the
interaction of the opposing forces. Battle outcome is
represented by the number of firing units, usually men, lost
on each side. A key assumption underlying much of Lanchester
theory, however, is that each firing unit fires the same kind
of ammunition, at the same rate, with the same accuracy as all
other firing units. In modelling land combat, this assumption
may not seriously weaken the model since the deviation of the
principal combatant's (soldier, tank, or artillery piece)
combat power, rate of fire, and accuracy from the values
embodied in the model are probably not great. Naval vessels
(platforms), however, differ greatly in armament and ability
to take punishment. It is, therefore, unrealistic to model
heterogeneous mixes of platforms as homogeneous "firing
units". Additionally, Lanchester-type models are inadequate
for representing the processes of scouting and C2 since their
focus is strictly on attrition.
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C. PROBLEMS OF VALIDATION
Most battle models have a credibility problem. This stems
from the fact that no serious attempt has been made to
validate them. According to Clayton Thomas [Ref. 2)
validation is a problematic issue:
...validation involves testing the agreement of a
model.. .with reality. One is required, therefore, to
establish what is "reality" and what constitutes "adequate
agreement", and to specify what sort of pronouncements are
to be made in the respective cases of agreement and non-
agreement. Each of these steps, even in the simplest
case.. .poses fundamental and profound difficulties.
Determining what is to be the standard of reality is
perhaps the most difficult problem encountered in the
validation process. The two primary candidates are exercise
results and historical combat data. Exercise results have the
virtue of being drawn from a designed experiment. Therefore,
they are usually complete, specific, and easily measured.
Unfortunately, they are only as valid as the assumptions made
in designing the experiment. Combat data have the virtue of
being drawn from real life and are, therefore, free of
underlying assumptions. The difficulties involved in
researching combat data and verifying their accuracy,
however, have caused many modelers to shy away from this
approach. Yet, the fact that historical data are drawn from
real life makes them, potentially, the most powerful tools for
validating a battle model. Corroborating a battle model's
results by comparing its prediction of the outcome of a
3
historical battle with the actual outcome would lend the model
a high degree of credibility.
D. RESEARCH GOALS
A naval battle model which incorporates Hughes' tactical
theory would help line naval officers put that theory into
practice. The goals of this research, therefore, have been
to:
- Develop a naval battle model which incorporates
Hughes' tactical theory.
- Corrcborate the model's results by comparing its
predictions of historical battle outcomes with the
actual outcomes.
- Demonstrate the model's value as a tactical planning
tool by using it to evaluate the tactical options of
one of the opponents in a historical naval battle.
This report describes the results of the resea.rch and is
submitted to generate interest in the development and
implementation of naval battle models for use in the fleet.
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II. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND VERIFICATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe how the model and the computer
program into which it is incorporated work and summarize the
program verification procedure.
B. DEFINITIONS
The following terminology will be used throughout.
1. Firepower Kill
A platform which has suffered a firepower kill has
suffered damage sufficient to prevent it from contributing
combat power to the force.
2. 1000 Pound Bomb Equivalent (TPBE)
TPBE is a unit of destruction equal to the explosive
power of 660 pounds of TNT (the explosive charge of a U.S.
World War II - vintage 1000 pound bomb). The explosive power
of all weapons will be expressed as multiples of 660 pounds
of TNT contained in the warhead.
3. Theoretical Combat Power




FC is defined for individual platforms. It is the
number of TPBE's which a platform's main battery guns can fire
per minute.
b. Pulse (FP)
FP is defined for each "pulse weapon" type carried
by a platform. Pulse weapons are weapons which deliver
instantaneously a massive amount, or pulse, of firepower
against a target. Such weapons include missiles, bombs, and
torpedoes. The FP of a given weapon type is the number of
TPBE's which the platform can fire in a single salvo.
4. Weapon Effectiveness
Weapon effectiveness is defined in the same categories
as theoretical combat power.
a. Continuous (PC)
PC is defined for groups of platforms which fire
as a single unit. It is the probability that a single shell
fired from a group's main battery will strike its target.
b. Pulse (PP)
PP is defined for each type of pulse weapon fired
by a group of platforms firing as a unit. It is the
probability that a single pulse weapon will strike its target.
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5. Effective Combat Power
a. Continuous (EFC)
EFC is defined for a group of platforms firing as
a unit. It is the number of TPBE's, fired from a group's main
battery guns, which strike their targets per minute.
b. Pulse (EPP)
EFP is defined for each pulse weapon type carried
by a group of platforms firing as a unit. It is the number
of TPBE's of a given weapon type, fired by a group in a single
salvo, which strike their targets.
6. Staying Power (SP)
A platform's SP is defined as the number of TPBE hits
necessary to inflict a firepower kill on that platform.
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION
1. General Description
Naval combat is modeled as a force-on-force attrition
process. Component groupings of each force are portrayed as
aggregations of the SP, FC, and FP values of their individual
platforms. Attrition is computed in discrete time steps and
is represented by the simultaneous degradation of each force's
aggregate SP, FC, and FP over time.





k = Group of platforms within a force
1 = One of the two forces in a battle (A or B)
1' = The other force
b. Computation of Individual Platform Values
(1) Staying Power. The SP of a platform is
computed as a function of its full load displacement as
follows:
sPjkt = 0.07 x (full load displacement)113  (1)
This equation was derived from analysis of a data set of 75
platforms from World Wars I and II which were determined to
have suffered firepower kills as a result of attacks by
shells, bombs or torpedoes. A full discussion of this
analysis is found in Appendix A.
(2) Theoretical Continuous Combat Power. The
number of TPBE's which can be fired by a main battery gun per
minute is computed as follows:
weight
fCijkl =----------- ) X Wt9 (2)
660 lbs.
where:
fcijkt = number of TPBE's fired by gun i of
platform j of group k, force 1 per
minute.
weight = explosive weight in pounds of TNT
which the gun fires per minute.
Wtg = 2.5
8
The value of Wt9 was derived from the warship
survivability analysis (Appendix A). It gives added weight to
a gun's shell over a bomb of equal explosive weight apparently
because a shell adds its much greater kinetic energy of impact
to the destructive power of its explosive charge.
The FC of a platform is computed as follows:
fcjkL = E fcijk (3)
ionJ
(3) Theoretical Pulse Combat Power. The number of
TPBE's of a particular type of pulse weapon which a platform
can fire in a single salvo is a function of the number and
distribution of firing mechanisms of that weapon. A cruiser,
for example, with four 24" torpedo tubes mounted on her port
side and four on her starboard side can fire four 24"
torpedoes per salvo. The FP of a pulse weapon type on a
platform is computed as follows:
weight
fPjkt = (------- ) x (# of weapons per salvo) x Wtp (4)
660 lbs.
where:
fPijkt = number of TPBE's of pulse weapon type
i which can be fired in a salvo by
platform j, of group k, force 1.
weight = explosive weight in pounds of TNT of
a warhead of pulse weapon type i.
WtP = 1.25 for torpedoes,
1.00 for bombs
9
The values of Wt were also derived from the
survivability analysis (Appendix A). The additional weight for
torpedoes over bombs seems justified by the fact that a
torpedo damages a platform below her waterline, adding
stability loss through flooding to the damage caused by the
explosion. A weight for anti-ship missiles was not determined
since the survivability analysis included no platforms damaged
by ASM's.
c. Aggregation of Individual Platforms into Groups
A group is a subdivision of a force containing one
or more of that force's platforms. All platforms in a group
fire as a unit. The user determines the number and
composition of each force's groups based on:
- Desired geographic disposition of a force's platforms.
- Sub-division of platforms by type (cruiser, destroyer,
etc.).
- Tactical employment of the platforms (screen, scouts,
main body, etc.).
The aggregate SP of each group is computed as
follows
SPkt Z Spjkt Vk, Vl (5)jassigned
to group k
The aggregate FC of each group and the FP of each
pulse weapon type in each group are computed as follows:




FPikL = Z fPijkt Vi, Vk, Vl (7)
j assigned
to group k
The PC of each group, PCkt, and the PP of each
pulse weapon type in each group, PPikt' are analogous to the
attrition rate coefficients of a Lanchester-type model.
Determination of their value is left to the user and should
be based on experimental results, battle data, or estimation
of own and enemy capabilities.
The EFC of each group and the EFP of each pulse
weapon type in each group can now be expressed as follows:
EFCkt = FCkt X PCkt Vk, Vi (8)
EFikt = FPik t X PPkAL Vi, Vk, V1 (9)
d. Additional Input Parameters
In addition to the SP, FC, and FP values of each
group of both forces, and the associated PC and PP values, the
user inputs into the model information concerning the times
of commencement, duration, strength, and targets of each
group's continuous and pulse fire.
(.) Continuous Fire. Input parameters for each
group's continuous fire include:
- Time steps (one time step = one minute) of
commencement and duration of fire.
- Which groups of the opposing force are the targets of
this group's fire.
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(2) Pulse Weapon Fire. Input parameters for each
group's pulse weapon fire include:
- Time steps during which the weapons are fired.
- The pulse weapon types to be fired and the number of
TPBE's (up to FPIk) of each type to be fired in each
salvo.
- Which groups of the opposing force are the targets of
each salvo.
- The number of time steps until impact of each salvo.
Finally, the user determines the duration of
the engagement by specifying one of the following:
- Number of time steps to be run.
- The maximum acceptable percent loss in aggregate SP
which each force will sustain before breaking off the
engagement.
3. Model Variables
The aggregate SP, FC and FP values of all groups are
recomputed ateach time step, taking any attrition suffered in
that time step into account. The variables which represent
the simultaneous attrition to each group of both forces at
each time step t are:
SPkL(t) = aggregate SP of group k, force 1 at
time step t.
FCki(t) = aggregate FC of group k, force 1, at
time step t.
FPRkI(t) = aggregate FP of weapon type i, group
k, force 1 at time step t.
The total values for each force at time step t,
therefore, are:
SP i(t) = Z SPkt(t) (10)
k
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FCj (t ) = Z FCk1 (t) (11)
k
FPL(t)= Z Z FPiki(t) (12)
i k
4. Model Logic
The model is incorporated into a computer program
coded in FORTRAN 77. Using the input parameters computed or
specified by the user, the program:
- Starts and stops each group's continuous fire.
- Computes attrition to each group being fired on at
each time step throughout the specified duration of
the continuous fire.
- Fires pulse weapon salvoes and computes attrition to
the target groups at each time step in the future when
the salvoes strike their targets.
- Stops the engagement when the specified conditions for
cessation are met.
A complete program listing is found in Appendix C.
The program computes attrition at each time step
against those groups which are undergoing continuous fire or
being struck by pulse weapons during that time step.
a. Continuous Fire Attrition
If continuous fire is taking place during the time
step, the program sums the current aggregate SP values of the
groups under attack:





SPkt(t-l) = SP of group k, force 1 at the end
of time step t-l.
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The program then computes the aggregate EFC of the attacking
groups as follows:
AEFC = k FCk W (t-l) X PCkt, (14)k firing
from I'
where:
FCkt,(t-l) = FC of group k, force 1' at the
end of time step t-l.
Finally, the continuous fire loss percentage, LC, is computed
as follows:
LC = AEFC (15)
TS
LC is applied to the SP, FC, and FP values of the
target groups. These values are updated for all groups of
each force at each time step as follows:
SPkt(t) = SPkt (t-l) x (1-LC) Vk under attack. (16)
= SPkL (t-l) otherwise. (17)
FCkt(t) = FCkt (t-l) x (I-LC) Vk under attack. (18)
= FCkL (t-l) otherwise. (19)
FPik t (t) = FPik t (t- 1 ) x (I-LC) Vk under attack. (20)
= FPkt (t-l) otherwise. (21)
b. Pulse Fire Attrition
If a pulse weapon salvo is striking its target,
the program sums the current SP values of the groups being
attacked as before. The program then computes the aggregate
EFP of the salvo as follows:
AEFP = PULSE,, x PP, (22)
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where:
PULSE,, = FP of the salvo fired from force 1'.
PP11 = PP of the salvo fired from force 1'.
Finally, the pulse fire loss percentage, LP, is computed as
follows:
LP = AEFP (23)
TS
LP is applied to the SP, FC, and FP values of the
target groups. The updated values for all groups are computed
in the same manner as following continuous fire attrition with
LP replacing LC in equations (16), (18) and (20).
Once the updated values are computed for each
group, the program computes the updated totals for each force
using equations (10), (11) and (12). These totals, reflecting
each force's aggregate SP, FC, and FP at the end of the time
step, are printed in an output file for analysis by the user.
When the program stops the engagement, the total
percentage lost of each force's SP, FC, and FP are computed
and printed in the output file. A sample output file is found
in Appendix C.
D. ALGORITHM VERIFICATION
The program was verified to be logically correct by
calculating and inputting parameters designed to test the
program's intricacies. The program's output was then compared
to a hand-calculated result.
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The input parameters included:
- Division of each force into more than one group.
- Assignment of different SP, FC, PC, FP, and PP values
to each group.
- Variation of the combat interaction among the groups
including one against one and two against two
continuous and pulse fire.
The hand-calculated result, which represents how the
algorithm should perform, and the model result, which
represents how it actually performs, were found to be
identical.
E. CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing, it can be seen that a naval battle
model has been developed which:
- Portrays naval forces as aggregations of the staying
power and theoretical combat power of heterogeneous
mixes of platforms.
- Models the engagement of these forces as a
force-on-force attrition process with attrition
suffered via continuous fire and/or through the impact
of pulse weapons.
- Permits the user to vary inputs concerning the time,
strength, target and duration of each force's fire in
order to explore each force's tactical options.
- Computes attrition to the opposing forces
simultaneously throughout the engagement and provides
a result in terms of the percent SP, FC and FP lost by
each force.
These are precisely the criteria which were set forth
above for a naval battle model which embodies the essence of
Hughes' tactical theory. It seems, therefore, that the model
16
is an appealing one. The acid test, however, is to use it to
analyze actual data to determine if it performs as advertised.
17
III. GATHERING HISTORICAL DATA FOR MODEL VALIDATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Hixon and Hodges [Ref. 3] have succinctly stated a major
inadequacy of current combat models:
Combat simulation models have almost no empirical basis
at all. One reason for this appears to be a general
belief that relevant data don't exist. This apparent
belief is false: historical archives are full of detailed
data relevant to a range of combat activities....
One of the major goals of this work has been to take a step
toward remedying this shortcoming by using historical naval
battle data in the process of model validation. To achieve
this goal, it was necessary to gather data relevant to the
analysis. This chapter will describe the process of
identifying the relevant data and summarize the data gathered.
B. NAVAL BATTLES TO BE STUDIED
The first step in the data gathering process was to
determine the battles from which data would be drawn.
Research was limited to twentieth century naval battles
primarily because there are many published accounts of them.
The battles were divided into three categories.
1. Continuous Fire Battles
Continuous fire battles are those in which gunfire was
applied continuously by each side as the primary means of
inflicting damage. The battles selected in this category are:
18
- Coronel, 01 November 1914.
- Falkland Islands, 08 December 1914.
- Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915.
- River Plate, 18 December 1939.
- Komandorski Islands, 25 March 1943.
2. Mixed Fire Battles
Mixed (continuous and pulse) fire battles are tnose in
which one or both sides attempted (usually with success) to
use pulse weapons to decisive effect. Gunfire was still used,
however, to inflict considerable damage. Battles in this
category are:
- Savo Island, 08 August 1942.
- Guadalcanal (Second Night), 14 November 1942.
- Tassafaronga, 30 November 1942.
- Kula Gulf, 06 July 1943.
- Vella Gulf, 06 August 1943.
3. Pulse Fire Battles
Pulse fire battles are those in which effective combat
power was applied in pulses with continuous gunfire playing no
part. Battles in this category are:
- Coral Sea, 07 May 1942.
- Midway, 04 June 1942.
- Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942.
- Santa Cruz Islands, 26 October 1942.
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These battles were selected because they allowed the model
to be exercised in fundamentally different scenarios so that
the degree of its potential for broad application could be
determined.
C. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RELEVANT DATA
The process of identifying relevant data from a massive
amount of published information involved answering four basic
questions:
- What data are needed to compute each force's
theoretical combat power?
- What data are needed to estimate each force's weapon
effectiveness?
- What data are needed to compute each force's aggregate
staying power?
- What data are needed to portray the interacti~ns of
forces in a battle and a battle's outcome?
Answering these questions provided a systematic approach to
the gathering of data which greatly simplified the research
process.
D. SUMMARY OF DATA GATHERED
1. Weapons Data
Relevant weapons data included those characteristics
necessary to compute the FC or FP of a given weapon.
a. Continuous Weapons
Data was gathered on the main and secondary
battery guns of all platforms in each battle. This data
included:
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- Bore diameter and calibre.
- TNT-equivalent explosive weight of shell.
- Rate of fire in rounds per minute.
b. Pulse Weapons
Data was gathered on platform-launched torpedoes,
aircraft-launched torpedoes, and air-dropped bombs (as
applicable) carried by each platform in each battle. These
data included:
- Designation of the weapon (size, weight, etc.).
- TNT-equivalent explosive weight of the weapon's
warhead.
2. Platform Data
Relevant data included those platform characteristics
which, when coupled with associated weapon characteristics,
permit the computation of a given platform's FC and FP values.
These data included:
- Number and designation of all main and secondary
battery guns.
- Designation, number and number per salvo of platform
fired torpedoes.
- Number and weapon load-out of each type of aircraft
carried.
Additionally, each platform's full load displacement
was needed in order to compute its SP value.
3. Force Interaction
In addition to the characteristics of the weapons and
platforms employed in each battle, data was gathered
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pertaining to the interaction of the opposing forces. These
data included:
- Origin, target, time of commencement and time of
cessation of continuous fire.
- Number of each size of shell which was fired and
number which hit their targets.
- Origin, target, time of fire and time of impact of
each pulse weapon salvo.
- Type of weapon fired, number of weapons fired and
number of weapons which struck their targets in each
pulse weapon salvo (including air strikes).
- Duration (in minutes) of the battle.
4. Battle Outcome
Finally, data were gathered pertaining to the outcome
of each battle including:
- Which platforms suffered firepower kills or were
totally lost.
- Which platforms were damaged.
E. DATA SOURCES
Characteristics of weapons and platforms were drawn from
modern technical works on historical naval forces.
Particularly useful were Campbell [Ref. 4] and Gardner [Refs.
5 and 6]. Data on force interactions and battle outcomes
were drawn from official and unofficial histories. All data
were corroborated with at least two sources. A complete list
of all works consulted is found in the bibliography.
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F. CONCLUSION
The data collected on fourteen twentieth century naval
battles were gathered to compute model input parameters
representing the forces involved in each battle, their
interaction in battle, and the outcome of each battle. The
next chapter will discuss in detail how these data were used
in the process of model validation.
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IV. MODEL VALIDATION WITH HISTORICAL DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
Given the data from each of the 14 battles described in
Chapter III, model input parameters were computed which
represented as closely as possible the SP, FC, and FP values
of the opposing forces as well as the interaction of those
forces in the battle. The model was run using these input
parameters and its results were compared with computed values
representing each battle's actual outcome. Discrepancies were
noted and explained and the model was revised as necessary.
Finally, conclusions were drawn as to the model's validity.
This chapter will discuss this analysis, its results and
the conclusions drawn from it.
B. DERIVING MODEL INPUT PARAMETERS FROM HISTORICAL DATA
1. Determining the Component Groupings of Each Force's
Platforms
The composition of the component groupings of each
force's platforms was determined based on the following
criteria:
- The tactical dis- -sition of each force as it actually
existed in the battle.
- Which platforms fired weapons in the battle.
- Which platforms were the targets of the opposing force's
fire.
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- Whether the platforms in the group had the same main
battery guns.
The last item was only a consideration for those
platforms of the force which actually fired their guns.
2. Computation of Initial Values for Each Group
a. Theoretical Continuous Combat Power
The FC of each component group was determined by
computing the value for all main battery guns on each platform
of the group and then summing the values of all the platforms.
Secondary battery guns were included only if they were fired
with any effect in the battle.
b. Theoretical Pulse Combat Power
FP was determined by computing the value for each
pulse weapon type on each platform and then summing the values
of each type for all of the platforms.
c. Continuous Weapon Effectiveness
Each group's PC was estimated by taking the ratio
of the number of its shells which hit their targets in the
battle to the number of shells fired. If the number of shells
fired could not be found in the historical accounts, it was
estimated for each group as follows:
NSkL = NMBGk( x MROF x DOFkL (I)
where:
NSk L = estimated number of shells fired by the main
battery guns of group k, force 1.
NMBGkL = number of main battery guns carried by all
platforms in group k, force 1.
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MROF = maximum rate of fire (in shells per minute) of a
main battery gun.
DOFkL = duration of fire of the group's guns (in minutes)
as found in the historical accounts.
d. Pulse Weapon Effectiveness
PP of each pulse weapon type in each group was
estimated by taking the ratio of the number of the group's
weapons which struck their targets in the battle to the total
number of weapons fired. If the total number of weapons fired
could not be found in the historical accounts, it was
estimated by assuming that, for each salvo, the group fired
the maximum number possible in a single salvo.
e. Staying Power
Each platform's SP was computed using equation (1)
of Chapter TI. Each group's aggregate SP was determined by
summing the SP values of all platforms in the group.
3. Determining Time of Commencement and Duration of Each
Group's Continuous Fire
The time of commencement of a group's continuous fire
was taken directly from the historical account of the battle
under consideration. The duration of fire, however, was often
more difficult to determin2. While the historical accounts
usually give the commencement and cessation times of each
group's fire, they are often unclear as to how intermittent
the fire was during that interval. It was, therefore,
necessary to estimate duration of fire as follows:
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NSkt (2)
DOFkt = NMBGkL x MROF
If the number of shells fired, NSk, was not available,
duration of fire was estimated to be the number of minutes
between the given times of commencement and cessation under
the assumption that all guns that could bear fired
continuously during this interval at their maximum firing
rates.
4. Determining Time of Fire, Time of Impact and
Theoretical Combat Power of Pulse Weapons Salvoes
The times of fire and times of impact of a group's
pulse weapon salvoes were taken directly from the historical
accounts of the battle under consideration. The FP of each
salvo was computed using the type and number of pulse weapons
fired in the salvo.
C. COMPUTING VALUES REPRESENTING A BATTLE'S ACTUAL OUTCOME
Each battle's actual outcome was expressed in terms of the
percent FC and FP lost by each force. It was not, however,
possible to determine these percentages precisely since it was
unclear in most historical accounts to what extent the damage
a platform received contributed to loss of combat power unless
the platform suffered at least a firepower kill. It was,
however, possible to establish lower and upper bounds on each
force's loss of FC and FP. The lower limits of the resulting
theoretical combat power loss intervals represent the percent
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theoretical combat power loss intervals represent the percent
of a force's FC or FP carried by all of the force's platforms
suffering at least a firepower kill during a given battle. The
upper limits represent the percent of FC or FP carried by all
of the force's platforms suffering at least some damage in the
battle.
1. Computing a Force's FC Loss Interval
The lower limit of the FC loss interval for a given
force in a given battle was computed as follows:
LCL SLCW (3)TCWt
where:
LCLI = The lower limit of the FC loss intervl
of force 1.
SLCW = The TNT explosive weight which could be
fired per minute by all main battery guns
of force l's platforms which suffered at
least a firepower kill.
TCWL = The TNT explosive weight which could be
fired per minute by all main battery guns
of all platforms in force 1.
The upper limit was computed as follows:
= SLCW + DCWL (4)
UCL1  TCWt
where:
UCL( = The upper limit of the FC loss interval
of force 1.
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DCW1  = The TNT explosive weight which could be
fired by all force 1 platforms which were
damaged but were not sunk or did not
suffer firepower kill.
2. Computing a Force's FP Loss Interval
The lower limit of the FP loss interval for a force




LPLt = The lower limit of the FP loss interval
of force 1.
SLPW l = The TNT explosive weight of all pulse
weapons of all types which could be
fired in a single salvo by all force 1
platforms which suffered at least a
firepower kill.
TPWI = The TNT explosive weight of all pulse
weapons of all types which could be
fired in a single salvo by all force 1
platforms.
The upper limit was computed as follows:
SLPW + DPWt (6)
UPL1  = TPWt
where:
UPLt  = The upper limit of the FP loss
interval of force 1.
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DPWt  = The TNT explosive weight of all pulse
weapons of all types which could be
fired in a single salvo by all force
1 platforms which iere damaged but
were not sunk or did not suffer
firepower kill.
D. COMPARING MODEL RESULTS WITH COMPUTED ACTUAL BATTLE
OUTCOMES
To test the credibility of the model's results, the
following steps were performed for each battle:
- Model input parameters derived from the historical
accounts of the battle were computed using the
procedures discussed above.
- An FC loss interval and an FP loss interval were
computed for each force.
- The model was run using the parameters computed from
historical data and the resulting loss in each force's
FC and FP, as predicted by the model, were recorded.
The model was deemed to have produced a credible result
if, for both forces:
- The predicted percent loss in total PC fell within the
FC loss interval.
- The predicted percent loss in total FP fell within the
FP loss interval.
If any of the model values fell outside the intervals an
attempt was made to discover the cause to determine if:
- The discrepancy was the result of a weakness in the
model's assumptions indicating a need to revise the
model or
- The discrepancy was the result of some anomaly of
nature which did not threaten the model's assumptions.
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If a weakness was found in the model's assumptions, they
were revised and the validation process was repeated to
determine if the revised model produced a credible result.
The strength of this validation process lies in the fact
that computation of the theoretical combat power loss
intervals involved no underlying, unsupportable assumptions.
They were computed using data which were easily observed in
the historical accounts of each battle.
The weakness of the process stems from the fact that it
was not possible to determine a single value representing the
battle's actual outcome for those battles in which some ships
were damaged but did not suffer a firepower kill. While the
model assumes that loss of theoretical combat power is
proportional to the number of TPBE hits received, the extent
to which the number of hits received contributes to loss of
theoretical combat power is not observable from the historical
accounts. Hits may not damage guns or pulse weapon launchers
directly but may damage supporting "systems" such as fire
control, propulsion, structural integrity, and personnel.
While damage to these systems degrades combat power, the
extent of this degradation is unclear. Therefore, the
computation of loss intervals was chosen as the most precise
representation of theoretical combat power loss which could
be made. Unfortunately, these intervals may be fairly wide.
While it is clear that the model's results should fall within
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them, it is not possible to make any other assertions about
the credibility of the model's results.
The conclusion, therefore, is that the validation process
is limited. It does permit conclusions to be drawn, however,
about the credibility of the model's results and is, there-
fore, a first step in the continuous process of validation.
E. INDIVIDUAL BATTLE ANALYSES
The validation process discussed above was conducted using
data from the fourteen naval battles. Summarized below are
the input parameters and validation results for each battle.
Each summary includes the following:
- Participating platforms listed by the groups into
which each force was organized.
- Brief summary of the significant events of the battle.
- Computation of the model's input parameters and
theoretical combat power loss intervals.
- Tables of input parameters.
- Comparison of model results with the loss intervals.
- Conclusions.
The characteristics of the platforms and weapons employed
in each battle are found in Appendix B. These characteristics
were used to compute model input parameters not specifically
discussed below. Table 4-1 provides a key to reading the
subsequent tables found in this chapter.
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TABLE 4-1 KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN INPUT PARAMETER TABLES
ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION
FC Theoretical continuous combat power.
PC Continuous weapon effectiveness.
FP1 (FP2, FP3) Theoretical pulse combat power of
pulse weapon type 1 (2 or 3).
PPl (PP2, PP3) Pulse weapon effectiveness of pulse
weapon type 1 (2 or 3).
SP Staying power.
GF Groups firing.
GBA Groups being attacked.
TOF Time of fire.
DOF Duration of fire.
TUI Time until impact.
TP Pulse weapon type.
E Theoretical pulse combat power of
pulse weapon salvo fired.
1. Battle of Coronel - 01 November 1914
Bennet [Ref. 7] was the primary source of data on this
battle. Corbett [Ref. 8] was used as a secondary source.
a. Force Disposition
TaI!"a 4-2-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
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TABLE 4-2-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF CORONEL
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (BRITISH) 1 GOOD HOPE, MONMOUTH
2 GLASGOW
B (GERMAN) 1 SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU
2 LEIPZIG, DRESDEN
b. Significant Events
Table 4-2-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-2-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF CORONEL
TIME EVENT
1620 GLASGOW sights German squadron.
1630 LEIPZIG sights British squadron.
1900 SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU open fire on
GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH.
1906 GOOD HOPE, MONMOUTH and GLASGOW return
fire.
1920 DRESDEN and LEIPZIG open fire on GLASGOW
and drive her out of the engagement.
2000 GOOD HOPE sinks.
2130 MONMOUTH sinks.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Continuous Wenpon Effectiveness. SCHARNHORST
and GNEISENAU fired approximately 1800 shells scoring 50 hits.
Their PC was, therefore, estimated to be 0.028. DRESDEN and
LEIPZIG fired their 4.1" guns for two minutes resulting in an
estimate of 400 shells fired. Five hits were scored and
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therefore, their PC was estimated to be 0.012. GLASGOW fired
for 15 minutes resulting in an estimate of 210-6" shells
fired. Six hits were scored resulting in an estimated PC of
0.028. GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH fired with no effect throughout
the battle.
(2) Duration of Continuous Fire. SCHARNHORST and
GNEISENAU, having fired 1800 shells, were estimated to have
fired for 28 minutes.
All input parameters are summarized in Tables 4-
2-C and 4-2-D.
TABLE 4-2-C CORONEL--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC SP
A (BRITISH) 1 7.27 0.000 3.21
2 0.42 0.028 1.23
B (GERMAN) 1 4.32 0.028 3.30
2 4.33 0.012 2.23
TABLE 4-2-D CORONEL--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (BRITISH) 1 2 1 6 15
B (GERMAN) 1 1 1 1 28
2 2 2 19 2
35
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH were destroyed and GLASGOW
was damaged at Coronel resulting in an FC loss interval of
94.18% - 100.00%. SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were damaged
resulting in an FC loss interval for the German force of 0.00%
- 49.92%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss Intervals
and Conclusions
Table 4-2-E summarizes the result of the comparison.
TABLE 4-2-E CORONEL--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH LOSS
INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL
LOST
A (BRITISH) 94.18 94.77 100.00
B (GERMAN) 0.00 2.67 49.92
Since the model results fall within the computed
intervals, there is no reason to question them.
2. Battle of Falkland Islands - 08 December 1914
Bennet [Ref. 7] was the primary source of data on this
battle. Corbett [Ref. 8] was used as a secondary source.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-3-A summarizes the forces involved in the
battle.
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TABLE 4-3-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (BRITISH) 1 INVINCIBLE, INFLEXIBLE
B (GERMANS) 1 SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU
b. Significant Events
Table 4-3-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-3-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF FALKLAND
ISLANDS
TIME EVENT
0756 German squadron, closing the British
colony in the Falkland Islands for a raid,
sights a British battlecruiser squadron
anchored in the harbor. At the same time,
British lookouts sight the German ships.
1250 British battlecruisers come within firing
range of SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU and
open fire. The German cruisers
immediately return fire.
1320 German light cruisers speed away with
British cruisers in pursuit.
1400 British battlecruisers disengage and
maneuver for better firing position.
1445 British battlecruisers reopen fire.




c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) continuous Weapon Effectiveness. The British
battlecruisers fired 1200-12" rounds, scoring 5 hits. PC,
therefore, was estimated to be 0.042. No data was available
on the Germans' duration of fire or number of shells fired.
German PC was, therefore, assumed to equal 0.028 (the PC
displayed at Coronel).
(2) Duration of Continuous Fire. The battle was
essentially a fight to the death between the British and
Germans so fire was continued in the model until one side was
eliminated (TTD). All input parameters are summarized in
tables 4-3-C and 4-3-D.
TABLE 4-3-C FALKLAND ISLANDS--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL
COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC SP
A (BRITISH) 1 8.21 0.042 3.82
B (GERMAN) 1 4.32 0.028 3.30
TABLE 4-3-D FALKLAND ISLANDS--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (BRITISH) 1 1 1 1 TTD
B (GERMAN) 1 1 1 1 TTD
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
The Germans lost both SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU so
the interval shrinks to a point equal to 100%. Damage on the
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British side was sustained by INVINCIBLE resulting in an FC
loss interval of 0% - 50%.
e. Compariseu of '4odel Results with the Loss Intervals
and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-3-E.
TABLE 4-3-E FALKLAND ISLANDS--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS
WITH LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL
LOST
A (BRITISH) 0.00 17.32 50.00
B (GERMAN) 100.00 100.67 100.00
Since the results fall within the computed
intervals, there is no reason to question them.
3. Battle of Dogger Bank - 24 January 1915
The primary source for data on this battle was
Campbell [Ref. 9]. Corbett [Ref. 8] was the secondary source.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-4-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
TABLE 4-4-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS









The German armored cruiser BLUCHER was not
included in the German force since she was not considered
capable of seriously damaging the British battlecruisers.
b. Significant Events
Table 4-4-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-4-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK
TIME EVENT
0730 British and German battlecruiser squadrons
sight each other.
0906 LION and TIGER open fire on German
battlecruisers.
0912 German battlecruisers open fire on British
battlecruisers.
0933 Due to confused signals, TIGER shifts fire
to SEYDLITZ, leaving MOLTKE untouched.
LION concentrates fire on SEYDLITZ.
0933 PRINCESS ROYAL engages and is engaged by
DERFFLINGER.
MOLTKE fires unopposed on LION and TIGER.
0950 Large explosion on SEYDLITZ causes her to
lose her aft turrets.
1000 LION, TIGER, SEYDLITZ and MOLTKE fire only
infrequently due to poor visibility.
1010 LION, TIGER, SEYDLITZ and MOLTKE resume
continuous fire.
1045 INDOMITABLE enters the engagement, firing
on BLUCHER.
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1050 LION falls out of the engagement.
Misleading signals from flagship leads
British battlecruisers to break off and
concentrate on BLUCHER.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Estimated Number of Shells Fired. Campbell
[Ref. 9] states that capital ship guns seldom fired at a rate
greater than one shell per minute during World War I.
Estimates of the number of shells fired by each ship,
therefore, were made on the assumption that the firing rates
of all main battery guns were one round per minute.
LION fired during a period of 96 minutes
resulting in an estimate of 768 shells fired. PRINCESS ROYAL
fired during a period of 101 minutes resulting in an estimate
of 808 shells fired. SEYDLITZ and MOLTKE fired during a
period of 95 minutes resulting in an estimate of 950 shells
fired by each platform.
(2) Duration of Continuous Fire. Since FC of each
platform is computed on the basis of the maximum firing rate
of the platform's main battery guns, the input parameters to
the model pertaining to duration of fire were computed using
the estimated number of shells fired (computed above) and the
maximum rate of fire of each platform's main battery guns.
LION was estimated to have fired 768 shells
and, therefore, to have fired the equivalent of 64 minutes at
her maximum firing rate. PRINCESS ROYAL was estimated to have
fired 808 shells and, therefore, to have fired the equivalent
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of 67 minutes at her maximum firing rate. SEYDLITZ and MOLTKE
were each estimated to have fired 950 shells and, therefore,
to have fired the equivalent of 63 minutes at their maximur
firing rates.
Each platform's estimated duration of fire was
distributed over the platform's firing events in the same
proportions as the actual, observed firing intervals.
(3) Continuous Weapon Effectiveness. LION and
PRINCESS ROYAL each scored three hits resulting in an
estimated PC for both of 0.004. SEYDLITZ and MOLTKE together
scored 22 hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.012.
No other battlecruisers fired with effect in
this engagement. All input parameters are summarized in
Tables 4-4-C and 4-4-D.
TABLE 4-4-C DOGGER BANK--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC SP
A (British) 1 5.08 0.004 2.18
2 5.08 0.004 2.18
3 5.08 0.000 2.32
4 4.11 0.000 1.97
5 4.11 0.000 1.91
B (German) 1 2.81 0.012 2.14
2 2.01 0.000 2.20
3 2.81 0.012 2.07
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TABLE 4-4-D DOGGER BANK--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (British) 1 1 1,3 1 37
2 2 2 6 67
3 1 1 66 27
B (German) 1 1,3 1,3 7 36
2 2 1 66 27
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
LION suffered a firepower kill in the battle and
TIGER vas damaged resulting in an FC loss interval of 24.37% -
48.74%. SEYDLITZ lost four of her main battery guns while
DERFFLINGER was also damaged. The FC loss interval for the
German force is, therefore, 14.73% - 63.17%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Theoretical
Combat Power Loss Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-4-E.
TABLE 4-4-E DOGGER BANK--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL
LOST
A (BRITISH) 24.37 30.20 48.74
B (GERMAN) 14.73 28.83 63.17
Since the model's results fall within the computed
intervals, there is no reason to question them.
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4. Battle of River Plate - 13 December 1939
The primary source for data on this battle was Pope
[Ref. 10]. Stephen [Ref. 11) was the secondary source.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-5-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
TABLE 4-5-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF RIVER PLATE
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (BRITISH) 1 EXETER
2 AJAX, ACHILLES
B (GERMAN) 1 GRAF SPEE
b. Significant Events
Table 4-5-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-5-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF RIVER PLATE
TIME EVENT
0552 GRAF SPEE sights British squadron.
0610 British squadron sights GRAF SPEE.
0617 GRAF SPEE opens fire on EXETER.
0618 British squadron opens fire on GRAF SPEE.
0730 EXETER falls out of the engagement. GRAF
SPEE shifts fire to AJAX and ACHILLES.
0740 British break off the engagement.
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c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Duration of Continuous Fire. EXETER fired
193 shells resulting in an estimated duration of fire of six
minutes. AJAX and ACHILLES together fired 1984 shells
resulting in an estimated duration of fire of 25 minutes.
GRAF SPEE fired 410 shells resulting in an estimated duration
of fire of 20 minutes.
Each platform's estimated duration of fire
was distributed over the platform's firing events in the same
proportion as the actual, observed firing intervals.
(2) Continuous Weapon Effectiveness. EXETER
scored 3 hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.016. AJAX and
ACHILLES scored 17 hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.009.
* GRAF SPEE scored 9 hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.022.
All input parameters are summarized in
Tables 4-5-C and 4-5-D.
TABLE 4-5-C RIVER PLATE--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC SP
A (British) 1 2.53 0.016 1.54
2 2.42 0.009 2.96
B (German) 1 3.91 0.022 1.78
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TABLE 4-5-D RIVER PLATE--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (British) 1 1,2 1 2 6
2 2 1 8 19
B (German) 1 1 1 1 18
2 1 2 18 2
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
EXETER suffered a firepower kill in the battle
and ACHILLES was damaged resulting in an FC loss interval of
51.14% - 75.57%. GRAF SPEE was damaged resulting in an FC
loss interval of 0.00% and 100.00%. Unfortunately, this
interval will not yield a very informative result.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-5-E.
TABLE 4-5-E RIVER PLATE--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL
LOST
A (BRITISH) 51.14 44.23 75.57
B (GERMAN) 0.00 35.46 100.00
As can be seen in the table, a major discrepancy
exists between the model's result and the FC loss interval for
the British force. Investigation revealed that the
discrepancy was caused by the fact that EXETER was knocked out
of the battle with fewer TPBE hits than predicted by the
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survivability model (Appendix A). This result, however, does
not suggest a major weakness in the model. EXETER's early
loss could have been the result of factors peculiar to the
platform such as:
- Poor damage control.
- Crew inefficiency due to lack of battle experience.
- Poor command and control due to lack of experience.
- Ship design weaknesses.
In other words, EXETER's early loss was an anomaly
attributable to EXETER herself rather than to the model. If
any criticism can be aimed at the model, therefore, it is that
it does not incorporate assumptions addressing the potential
causes of EXETER's loss listed above. Incorporation of such
detailed assumptions, houever, would over-complicate the model
and, therefore, diminish its utility. Users of the model,
however, should be aware that it does not incorporate these
issues.
5. Battle of Coral Sea - 08 May 1942
The primary source for data on this battle was Wilmont
[Ref. 12]. Morison [Ref. 13] and Dull [Ref. 14] were
secondary sources.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-6-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
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TABLE 4-6-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF CORAL SEA
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 LEXINGTON
2 YORKTOWN
B (JAPANESE) 1 SHOKAKU
2 ZUIKAKU
Only carriers were considered in this and
subsequent pulse fire battles since it was the carriers which
possessed the tactically significant combat power and which
were the targets of each force's attack.
b. Significant Events
Table 4-6-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-6-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF CORAL SEA
TIME EVENT
0820 U.S. search aircraft locate Japanese
carriers.
0822 Japanese search aircraft locate U.S.
carriers.
0907-1000 U.S. carriers launch an air strike
consisting of 28 Dauntless dive bombers
(1-1000 lb. HC bomb each) and 20
Devastator torpedo bombers (1-22.4"
torpedo each).
0915-1015 Japanese launch a strike consisting of 33
Val dive bombers (1-250 kg. SAP bomb each)
and 18 Kate torpedo bombers (1-18" torpedo
each).
1057 24 Dauntlesses and 9 Devastators attack
Japanese carriers. SHOKAKU hit by 2-1000
lb. HC bombs.
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1120 Japanese strike reaches U.S. carriers.
LEXINGTON hit by 2-250 kg. SAP bombs and
2-18" torpedoes. YORKTOWN hit by 1-250
kg. SAP bomb.
1140 11 Devastators and 4 Dauntlesses from a
second LEXINGTON strike attack. SHOKAKU
receives one additional 1000 lb. HC bomb
hit.
c. Computation of Input Parameters.
LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN launched 46 Dauntlesses, each
with a single 1000 lb. bomb. Three hits were scored resulting
in an estimated PP of 0.065. SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU launched 33
Vals, each armed with a 250 kg. bomb. Three hits were scored
resulting in an estimated PP of 0.091. Additionally, the
Japanese carriers launched 18 Kates, each armed with an 18"
torpedo. Two hits were scored resulting in an estimated PP
for this weapon of 0.111.
Model input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-6-C and 4-6-D. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon type one
(FP1, PP1) is the 1000 lb. HC bomb, pulse weapon type two
(FP2, PP2) is the 500 lb. HC bomb and pulse weapon type three
(FP3, PP3) is the 22.4" torpedo. For the Japanese force,
pulse weapon type one (FP1, PP1) is the 250 kg. SAP bomb and
pulse weapon type two (FP2, PP2) is the 18" torpedo.
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TABLE 4-6-C CORAL SEA--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FP1 PP1 FP2 PP2 FP3 PP3 SP
A (U.S.) 1 17.00 0.065 7.91 0.000 8.34 0.000 2.42
2 17.00 0.065 7.91 0.000 7.58 0.000 2.07
B (JAPAN) 1 3.68 0.091 12.10 0.111 2.42
2 3.46 0.091 11.17 0.111 2.24
TABLE 4-6-D CORAL SEA--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
A (U.S) 1 1,2 1 47 111 1 24.00
2 1,2 1 47 154 1 4.00
B (JAP) 1 1,2 1,2 55 125 1 7.14
2 1,2 1 55 125 2 16.76
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
LEXINGTON was lost in the battle while YORKTOWN was
damaged resulting in an FP loss interval of 50.48%-100.00%
SHOKAKU suffered a firepower kill resulting in an FP loss
value of 51.90%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Theoretical
Combat Power Loss Intervals and Conclusions.
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-6-E.
TABLE 4-6-E CORAL SEA--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH LOSS
INTERVALS
FORCE LPL % FP UPL
LOST
A (U.S.) 50.48 53.35 100.00
B (JAPAN) 51.90 51.90 51.90
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Since the model's results fall within the computed
intervals, there is no reason to question them.
6. Battle of Midway--04 June 1942
The primary source for data on this battle was Wilmont
(Ref. 12]. Morison [Ref. 13] and Dull [Ref. 14] were
secondary sources.
a. Force Disposition.
Table 4-7-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
TABLE 4-7-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A. (U.S.) 1 YORKTOWN
2 ENTERPRISE, HORNET
B (JAPAN) 1 KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU
2 HIRYU
b. Significant Events
Table 4-7-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-7-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
TIME EVENT
0710 First U.S. sighting of Japanese carrier
force.
0728 Float plane from Japanese carrier TONE
sights the YORKTOWN task force.
0802 HORNET and ENTERPRISE launch a strike
including 29 Devastators (1-22.4" torpedo
each), 33 Dauntlesses (1-1000 lb. HC bomb
each) and 34 Dauntless scouts (1-500 lb.
HC bomb each).
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0906 YORKTOWN launches a strike including 17
Dauntlesses (1-1000 lb. HC bomb each) and
12 Devastators (1-22.4" torpedo each).
0930-1015 29 Devastators from HORNET and ENTERPRISE
attack the Japanese carriers, no hits.
1026-1100 50 Dauntlesses and 30 Dauntless scouts
attack the Japanese carriers. AKAGI takes
two 1000 lb. bomb hits, KAGA takes four
hits and SORYU takes two hits.
1100 HIRYU launches a strike consisting of 18
Vals (1-250 kg. SAP bomb each).
1200 HIRYU launches 10 Kate torpedo bombers (1-
18" torpedo each).
HIRYU Vals attacks YORKTOWN scoring three
hits.
1430 HIRYU Kates attack YORKTOWN scoring two
hits.
1530 ENTERPRISE and HORNET launch 24
Dauntlesses (1-1000 lb. HC bomb each).
1700 24 Dauntlesses attack HIRYU scoring three
hits.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE launched 74 Dauntlesses,
scoring 12-1000 lb. bomb hits. The resulting estimated PP is
0.162. HIRYU launched 18 Vals, scoring 3-250 kg. bomb hits.
The resulting estimated PP is 0.167. Additionally, HIRYU
launched 10 Kates, scoring 2-18" torpedo hits. The resulting
estimated PP for this pulse weapon is 0.2.
Model input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-7-C and 4-7-D. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon type one
(FP1, PP1) is the 500 lb. HC bomb, pulse weapon type two (FP2,
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PP2) is the 1000 lb. HC bomb and pulse weapon type three (FP3,
PP3) is the 22.4" torpedo. For the Japanese force, pulse
weapon type one (FP1, PPI) is the 250 kg. SAP bomb and pulse
weapon type two (FP2, PP2) is the 18" torpedo.
TABLE 4-7-C MIDWAY--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER
AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FPl PPI FP2 PP2 FP3 PP3 SP
A (U.S.) 1 8.85 0.000 18.00 0.162 9.86 0.000 2.07
2 17.23 0.000 38.00 0.162 21.99 0.000 4.14
B (JAPAN) 1 11.67 0.000 63.31 0.000 0.000 6.33
2 3.89 0.167 16.76 0.200 0.000 1.52
TABLE 4-7-D MIDWAY--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
A (U.S) 1 2 1 1 145 2 17.00
2 1 2 1 145 2 16.00
3 1 1 65 81 2 17.00
4 2 2 470 91 2 24.00
B (JAP) 1 2 1 179 61 1 3.89
2 2 1 259 91 2 9'.31
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
YORKTOWN suffered a firepower kill resulting in an
FP loss value of 32.29%. The Japanese lost all four of their
carriers resulting in an FP loss value of 100.00%.
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e. comparison of Model Results with the Loss Intervals
and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-7-E.
TABLE 4-7-E MIDWAY--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH LOSS
INTERVALS
FORCE LPL % FP UPL
LOST
A (U.S.) 32.29 32.22 32.29
B (JAPAN) 100.00 100.00 100.00
As can be seen from the table, a minor discrepancy
exists between the model's result and the FP loss value for
the U.S. force. Investigation revealed that the discrepancy
stems from the fact that the FP loss intervals are computed
without the weights which the model assigns to torpedoes (see
equation (4) Chapter II). The rationale for this is that it
was desired that computation of the loss intervals involve no
underlying assumptions. Unfortunately, for battles involving
more than une pulse weapon type and uneven distribution of the
pulse weapons among the various groups of a force, failure to
assign the weights when computing the intervals leads to a
small, artificial discrepancy like the one above. It is not
felt, however, that this is a major problem since, in the case
of the U.S. force at Midway, both values imply the complete
loss of YORKTOWN.
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7. Battle of Savo Island -- 08 August 1942
The primary sources for data on this battle were
Morison [Ref. 15] and Dull [Ref. 14]. Newcomb [Ref. 16) was
used as a secondary source.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-8-A summarizes the disposition of the
forces in this battle.
TABLE 4-8-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS




5 SAN JUAN, HOBART
6 MONSSEN, BUCHANON
7 BLUE, RALPH TALBOT
B (JAPAN) I AOBA, KAKO, KINUGASA, FURUTAKA,
CHOKAI
2 TENRYU, YUBARI, YUNAGI
b. Significant Events
Table 4-8-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-8-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
TIME EVENT
0136 Japanese force sights U.S. Southern Force
(groups 3 and 4).
0138 Japanese fire 17-24" torpedoes.
0143 Japanese cruisers open fire on Southern
Force cruisers.
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0143 CANBERRA struck by 2-24" torpedoes and
a total of 24-8" shells.
0147 CHICAGO hit by 1-24" torpedo but manages
to open fire (ineffectively) on the
Japanese squadron.
0148 CHICAGO falls out of the battle.
Japanese fire 16-24" torpedoes at U.S.
Northern Force (groups 1 and 2).
Japanese cruisers open fire on U.S.
Northern Force.
0154 U.S. Northern Force cruisers open fire on
the Japanese.
0153 VINCENNES struck by several 8" shells.
KINUGASA struck by 1-8" shell.
0155 VINCENNES struck by 3-24" torpedoes,
QUINCY hit by 1-24" torpedo.
0155 ASTORIA struck by numerous 8" shells but
scores 2-8" hits on CHOKAI.
0156 Japanese force fires a complete salvo of
24" torpedoes.
0200 Japanese cease fire on Northern Force.
0213 BLUE and RALPH TALBOT engage the Japanese.
RALPH TALBOT hit by 4-8" shells.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Duration of Continuous Fire. The three U.S.
Northern Force cruisers fired 107-8" shells. Estimated
duration of fire, therefore, is one minute. BLUE and RALPH
TALBOT fired 385-5" shells. Estimated duration of fire of
the two destroyers, therefore, is two minutes. The five
Japanese heavy cruisers fired 1020-8" shells. Estimated
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heavy cruisers fired 1020-8" shells. Estimated duration of
fire of these cruisers, therefore, is eight minutes.
(2) Weapon Effectiveness. The U.S. Northern Force
cruisers scored four hits resulting in an estimated PC of
0.037. BLUE and RALPH TALBOT scored one hit resulting in an
estimated PC of 0.003. The Japanese heavy cruisers scored 92
hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.09. Finally, the
entire Japanese force fired 61-24" torpedoes, scoring 7 hits.
The resulting estimated PP is 0.115. No other platforms fired
with effect in this battle.
Model input parameters are summarized in
Tables 4-8-C, 1-8-D and 4-8-E. For the U.S. force, pulse
weapon type one (FPl, PPI) is the U.S. 21" torpedo and pulse
weapon type two (FP2, PP2) is the British 21" torpedo. For
the Japanese force, pulse weapon type one (FPI, PPI) is the
24" "Long Lance" torpedo.
TABLE 4-8-C SAVO ISLAND--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FPI PPI FP2 PP2 SP
A (U.S.) 1 9.03 0.037 4.89
2 4.17 0.000 24.93 0.000 1.84
3 6.38 0.000 3.31
4 4.17 0.000 24.93 0.000 1.84
5 11.70 0.000 6.23 0.000 5.51 0.000 2.90
6 5.21 0.000 31.17 0.000 1.88
7 4.17 0.003 24.93 0.000 1.84
B (JAPAN) 1 11.85 0.090 48.02 0.115 7.88
2 2.28 0.000 8.00 0.115 8.33 0.000 3.02
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TABLE 4-S-D SAVO ISLAND--SUMOARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 1 1,2 16 1
2 7 1,2 37 2
B (JAPAN) 1 1 3 5 2
2 1 1 10 5
3 1 7 37 1
TABLE 4-8-E SAVO ISLAND--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
B (JAPAN) 1 1,2 3 1 5 1 34.01
2 1,2 1 10 7 1 32.01
3 1,2 1 18 7 1 48.02
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
VINCENNES, ASTORIA, QUINCY, CANBERRA and RALPH
TALBOT were all lost as a result of the battle while CHICAGO
suffered a firepower kill and PATTERSON was damaged. The
resulting FC loss interval is 38.89%-43.60% and the resulting
FP loss interval is 10.49%-21.18%. The Japanese cruisers
KINUGASA and CHOKAI were damaged resulting in an FC loss
interval of 0.00%-39.47% and an FP loss interval of 0.00%-
37.31%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-8-F.
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TABLE 4-8-F SAVO ISLAND--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 38.89 39.77 43.60 10.49 12.28 21.18
B (JAPAN) 0.00 0.16 39.47 0.00 0.16 37.31
Since none of the model's values fall outside of
the intervals, there is no reason to question them.
S. Battle of the Eastern Solomons--24 August 1942
The primary sources for data on this battle were
Morison [Ref. 15] and Dull [Ref. 14].
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-9-A summarizes the disposition of the
forces in the battle.
TABLE 4-9-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF THE EASTERN
SOLOMONS
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 ENTERPRISE, HORNET
B (JAPAN) 1 RYUHO
2 SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU
b. Significant Events
Table 4-9-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-9-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE EASTERN
SOLOMONS
TIME EVENT
0905 U.S. land based aircraft locate RYUHO.
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1229 ENTERPRISE launches 16 Dauntless scouts
(1-500 lb. HC bomb each) and 7 Avengers
(1-22.4" torpedo each) to search for the
Japanese carriers.
1345 Based only on sketchy information, U.S.
carriers launch 30 Dauntlesses (1-1000
lb. HC bomb each) and 8 Avengers (1-22.4"
torpedo each) against RYUHO.
1405 Japanese float planes locate U.S.
carriers.
1410 ENTERPRISE aircraft locate RYUHO.
1420 ENTERPRISE aircraft locate SHOKAKU and
ZUIKAKU.
1507 Japanese carriers launch a strike of 27
Vals (1-250 kg. SAP bombs each).
1550 U.S. strike force attacks RYUHO. Japanese
carrier struck by 1-22.4" torpedo and 1-
1000 lb. bomb.
1641 Japanese strike attacks ENTERPRISE. The
carrier is struck by 3-250 kg. bombs.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
ENTERPRISE and HORNET launched 30 Dauntlesses and
scored 1-1000 lb. bomb hit resulting in an estimated PP for
this weapon of 0.033. Additionally, the two U.S. carriers
launched 8 Avengers and scored 1-22.4" torpedo hit resulting
in an estimated PP for this weapon of 0.125. SHOKAKU and
ZUIKAKU launched 27 VALS and scored 3-250 kg. bomb hits
resulting in an estimated PP of 0.111.
Model input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-9-C and 4-9-D. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon type one
(FP1, PP1) is the 500 lb. HC bomb, pulse weapon type two (FP2,
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PP2) is the 1000 lb. HC bomb and pulse weapon type three (FP3,
PP3) is the 22.4" torpedo. For the Japanese force, pulse
weapon type one (FP1, PPl) is the 18" torpedo and pulse weapon
type two (FP2, PP2) is the 250 kg. SAP bomb.
TABLE 4-9-C EASTERN SOLOMONS--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL
COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FP1 PP1 FP2 PP2 FP3 PP3 SP
A (U.S.) 1 16.77 0.000 36.00 0.033 22.75 0.125 4.54
B (JAPAN) 1 19.55 0.000 1.80
2 33.52 0.000 8.86 0.111 4.48
TABLE 4-9-D EASTERN SOLOMONS--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
A (U.S) 1 1 1 45 125 2 30.00
2 1 1 45 125 3 6.07
B (JAPAN) 1 2 1 127 94 2 5.84
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
ENTERPRISE was damaged resulting in an FP loss
interval for the U.S. force of 0.00%-50.00%. RYUHO was lost
resulting in an FP loss value for the Japanese force of
30.48%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Takle 4-9-E.
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TABLE 4-9-E EASTERN SOLOMONS--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS
WITH LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL
LOST
A (U.S.) 0.00 14.28 50.00
B (JAPAN) 30.48 30.67 30.48
The discrepancy between the model's result and
the FP loss value for the Japanese force is accounted for by
the same problem discovered in the analysis of the Battle of
Midway. As discussed in the Midway analysis, this discrepancy
is not considered to be a serious problem since the value
produced by the model and the computed loss value both
represent the loss of RYUHO.
9. Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands--26 October 1942
The primary sources for data on this battle were
Morison [Ref. 15] and Dull [Ref. 14].
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-10-A summarizes the disposition of the
forces in the battle.
TABLE 4-10-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ
ISLANDS
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS








Table 4-10-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-10-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ
ISLANDS
TIME EVENT
0500 U.S. carriers launch 16 Dauntless scouts
(1-500 lb. HC bomb each).
0650 Two other U.S. search aircraft locate the
main Japanese carrier force.
0730-0815 U.S. carriers launch a strike consisting
of 27 Dauntlesses (1-1000 lb. HC bomb
each) and 23 Avengers (1-22.4" torpedo
each).
0740 ENTERPRISE Dauntless scouts attack ZUIHO
scoring two bomb hits.
0758 Japanese carriers launch a strike
consisting of 22 Vals (1-250 kg. SAP bomb
each) and 18 Kates (1-18" torpedo each).
0830 Japanese carriers launch a second strike
consisting of 20 Vals and 18 Kates.
0845 JUNYO launches a strike consisting of 20
Vals (1-250 kg. SAP bomb each).
0910 First of the Japanese main strikes attacks
HORNET scoring five bomb hits and two
torpedo hits.
0930 U.S. air strike attacks the Japanese
carriers. SHOKAKU hit by four bombs.
1005 Second of the Japanese main strikes
attacks ENTERPRISE scoring two bomb hits.
1122 JUNYO's 20 Vals attack ENTERPRISE, no
hits.
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1400 JUNYO launches a second strike consisting
of five Vals (1-250 kg. SAP bomb each)
and six Kates (1-18" torpedo each).
1623 JUNYO's second strike attacks HORNET
scoring 1-18" torpedo hit.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU launched 42 Vals and scored
7-250 kg. bomb hits, resulting in an estimated PP of 0.167.
Additionally, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and ZUIHO launched 30 Kates and
scored 2-18" torpedo hits, resulting in an estimated PP for
this weapon of 0.067. JUNYO launched six Kates and scored 1-
18" torpedo hit , resulting in an estimated PP of 0.167. The
two U.S. carriers launched 27 Dauntlesses and scored 4-1000
lb. bomb hits, resulting in an estimated PP for this weapon of
0.148.
Model input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-10-C and 4-10-D. For the Japanese force, pulse weapon type
one (FPI, PPl) is the 250 kg. SAP bomb and pulse weapon type
two (FP2, PP2) is the 18" torpedo. For the U.S. force, pulse
weapon type one (FPl, PP1) is the 500 lb. HC bomb, pulse
weapon type two (FP2, PP2) is the 1000 lb HC bomb and pulse
weapon type three (FP3, PP3) is the 22.4" torpedo.
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TABLE 4-10-C SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS--STAYING POWER,
THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON
EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FP1 PPI FP2 PP2 FP3 PP3 SP
A (JAPAN) 1 4.32 0.167 21.41 0.067 0.000 2.24
2 5.84 0.167 16.76 0.067 0.000 2.24
3 5.59 0.167 0.000 1.70
4 4.54 0.000 9.31 0.167 0.000 2.14
B (U.S.) 1 8.38 0.125 18.00 0.148 9.10 0.000 2.42
2 8.38 0.125 18.00 0.148 11.38 0.000 2.07
TABLE 4-10-D SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
A (JAPAN) 1 1,2 2 179 72 1 4.76
2 1,2,3 2 179 72 2 16.76
3 1,2 1 211 95 1 4.32
4 1,2,3 1 211 95 2 11.17
5 4 2 541 143 2 5.59
B (U.S.) 1 1,2 3 1 160 1 7.45
2 1,2 1,3 151 120 2 27.00
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
SHOKAKU suffered a firepower kill in this battle
resulting in an FP loss value for the Japanese force of
45.36%. HORNET was lost and ENTERPRISE was damaged resulting
in an FP loss interval for the U.S. force of 51.32% -100.00%.
e. Comparisons of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-10-E.
65
TABLE 4-10-E SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS--COMPARISON OF MODEL
RESULTS WITH LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LPL % FP UPL
LOST
A (JAPAN) 45.36 46.22 45.36
B (U.S.) 51.32 61.67 100.00
The discrepancy between the model's result and
the FP loss value for the Japanese is accounted for by the
same problem discovered in the analyses of the Battle of
Midway and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. As discussed
in these other analyses, this discrepancy is not considered
to be a serious problem since the value produced by the model
and the computed loss value both represent the loss of
SHOKAKU.
10. Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Second Night)--14/15
November 1942.
The primary sources for data on this battle were
Morison [Ref. 15] and Dull [Ref. 14].
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-11-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
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TABLE 4-11-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE NAVAL BATTLE OF
GUADALCANAL (SECOND NIGHT)
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 SOUTH DAKOTA
2 WASHINGTON
3 WALKE, BENHAM, PRESTON, GWIN
B (JAPANESE) 1 SENDAI
2 SHIKINAMI, URANAMI, AYANAMI
3 NAGARA






Table 4-11-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-11-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF
GUADALCANAL (SECOND NIGHT)
TIME EVENT
2322 U.S. destroyers exchange fire with
AYANAMI and URANAMI.
2330 AYANAMI and URANAMI fire 18-24"
torpedoes.
2335 NAGARA, ASAGUMO, TERUZUKI, INAZUMA, and
SHIRAYUKI fire 34'-24" torpedoes.
WALKE fires 8-21" torpedoes.
WALKE and PRESTON, badly damaged, fall
out of the engagement.
2337 GWIN fires on NAGARA which, with four
destroyers, returns fire. GWIN is badly
damaged and is forced to withdraw minutes
later.
2338 WALKE and BENHAM each hit by one torpedo.
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2355 NAGARA and her four destroyers launch 34
more torpedoes.
NAGARA, ATAGO, TAKAO and KIRISHIMA open
fire on SOUTH DAKOTA. SOUTH DAKOTA
returns fire.
0005 WASHINGTON enters the engagement, firing
primarily on KIRISHIMA.
0010 SOUTH DAKOTA fails out of the engagement.
Battle is essentially over. Japanese
withdraw by 0025.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Number of Shells Fired. WASHINGTON fired both
her 16" battery and 5" battery (on one side) for eight
minutes. The number of 16" shells fired was given by Morison
[Ref. 15] to be 75 while the number of 5" shells was estimated
to be 1400 for a total estimate of 1475 shells fired. NAGARA
fired for a total of 20 minutes resulting in an estimate of
840 shells fired. KIRISHIMA fired for 18 minutes, resulting
in an estimate of 252 shells fired. ATAGO and TAKAO also
fired for 18 minutes, resulting in an estimate of 1440 shells
fired by both platforms.
(2) Weapon Effectiveness. WASHINGTON scored 49
hits, resulting in an overall estimate of this ship's PC of
0.033. NAGARA scored five hits, resulting in an estimated PC
of 0.006. KIRISHIMA scored one hit, resulting in an estimated
PC of 0.004. ATAGO and TAKAO scored 18 hits resulting in an
iate 'C of 0.013. Finally, SHIKINAMI, URANAMI and
AYANAMI together fired 18-24" torpedoes and scored two hits,
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resulting in an estimated PP for these platforms of 0.11. No
other platforms fired with effect in this battle.
Input parameters are summarized in Tables 4-
11-C, 4-11-D, and 4-11-E. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon
type one (FPl, PPl) is the 21" torpedo. For the Japanese
force, pulse weapon type one (FPl, PP1) is the 24" "Long
Lance" torpedo.
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
SOUTH DAKOTA suffered a firepower kill and the
four U.S. destroyers were lost, resulting in an FC loss value
for the U.S. force of 61.69% and an FP loss value of 100.00%.
KIRISHIMA was lost and ATAGO and TAKAO were damaged, resulting
in an FC loss interval for the Japanese Force of 25.99%-57.05%
and an FP loss interval of 0.00%-15.69%.
TABLE 4-11-C NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (SECOND NIGHT)--
STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER AND
WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FPI PPI SP
A (U.S.) 1 16.20 0.000 2.49
2 16.20 0.033 2.49
3 9.89 0.000 52.89 0.000 3.69
B (JAPAN) 1 1.34 0.000 16.01 0.000 1.35
2 2.15 0.000 54.02 0.110 2.83
3 1.34 0.006 8.00 0.000 1.25
4 3.61 0.000 60.03 0.000 3.89
5 5.83 0.004 2.23
6 6.97 0.013 32.01 0.000 3.44
7 1.19 0.000 34.01 0.000 1.84
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TABLE 4-11-D NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (SECOND
NIGHT)--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 2 5,6 49 8
B (JAPAN) 1 3 3 21 2
2 3,5,6 1 39 18
TABLE 4-11-E NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (SECOND
NIGHT)--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
B (JAPAN) 1 2 3 14 8 1 36.02
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-11-F.
TABLE 4-11-F NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (SECOND NIGHT)--
COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 61.69 51.71 61.69 100.00 100.00 100.00
B (JAPAN) 25.99 43.04 57.05 0.00 11.83 15.69
As can be seen from the table, a major discrepancy
exists between the model's percent FC loss result for the U.S.
force and the computed FC loss value. Investigation revealed
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that the discrepancy was caused by the fact that SOUTH DAKOTA
was knocked out of the battle with fewer TPBE hits than
predicted by the survivability model (Appendix A). As in the
case of the River Plate analysis above, this result does not
suggest a major weakness in the model. Instead, it points to
the fact that the model does not address the detailed issues
which make each platform peculiar unto itself and cause
anomalies such as the early firepower kill of SOUTH DAKOTA in
this battle.
11. Battle of Tassafaronga--30 November 1942
The primary sources for data on this batt were
Morison [Ref. 17] and Dull [Ref. 14].
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-12-A summarizes the disposition of forces
in the battle.
TABLE 4-12-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA,
NORTHAMPTON
2 HONOLULU
3 FLETCHER, DRAYTON, MAURY, PERKINS,
LAMSON, LARDNER
B (JAPAN) 1 TAKANAMI
2 NAGANAMI, MAKINAMI, KUROSHIO,
OYASHIO, KAGERO, KAWAKAZE, SUZUKAZE
b. Significant Events
Table 4-12-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
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TABLE 4-12-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF
TASSAFARONGA
TIME EVENT
2321 U.S. destroyers launch an ineffective
torpedo attack.
U.S. cruisers open fire on TAKINAMI.
TAKINAMI fires 8-24" torpedoes.
2327 MINNEAPOLIS struck by two of TAKINAMI's
torpedoes, NEW ORLEANS hit by one.
2328 KUROSHIO and OYASHIO fire 12-24"
torpedoes.
2330 KAWAKAZE, KUROSHIO and NAGANAMI fire 20-
24" torpedoes.
2339 PENSACOLA struck by one torpedo.
2348 NORTHAMPTON struck by two torpedoes.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Duration of Continuous Fire. The U.S. 8" gun
cruisers fired 363 shells resulting in an estimated duration
of fire of three minutes. Morison's account [Ref. 17]
portrays HONOLULU as firing her 6" guns during the same period
as the 8" cruisers so her duration of fire was also estimated
as three minutes.
(2) weapon Effectiveness. No data was available
on the number of U.S. shells which struck their targets. The
PC of the U.S. cruisers was, therefore, estimated to be 0.037,
the estimated PC of the U.S. cruisers at Savo Island.
TAKINAMI fired 8-24" torpedoes and scored three hits,
resulting in an estimated PP of 0.375. The remaining Japanese
ships fired 32-24" torpedoes and also scored three hits,
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resulting in an estimated PP of 0.094. No other ships fired
with effect in this battle.
Tables 4-12-C, 4-12-D and 4-12-E summarize the
model input parameters. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon type
one (FPl, PPl) is the 21" torpedo. For the Japanese force,
pulse weapon type one (FPl, PPI) is the 24" "Long Lance"
torpedo.
TABLE 4-12-C TASSAFARONGA--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC 1C FPI PPI SP
A (U.S.) 1 12.37 0.037 6.43
2 7.54 9.037 1.62
3 15.10 0.000 81.03 0.000 5.57
B (JAPAN) 1 0.48 0.000 16.01 0.375 0.96
2 3.34 0.000 112.05 0.094 6.57
TABLE 4-12-D TASSAFARONGA--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 1,2 1 1 3
TABLE 4-12-E TASSAFARONGA--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
B (JAPAN) 1 1 1 1 6 1 16.01
2 2 1 7 11 1 24.01
3 2 1 10 17 1 40.01
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d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
All four U.S. 8" gun cruisers suffered a firepower
kill, resulting in an FC loss value of 35.35% and an FP loss
value of 0.00%. TAKINAMI was lost in the engagement, resulting
in an FC loss value of 12.50% and an FP loss value of 12.50%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions.
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-12-F.
TABLE 4-12-F TASSAFARONGA--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FOPE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 35.35 35.35 35.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
B (JAPAN) 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50
Since the model's results match the computed
values, there is no reason to question them.
12. Battle of Komandorski Island--25 March 1943
The primary sources for data on this battle were
Morison [Ref. 18] and Dull [Ref. 14].
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-13-A summarizes the disposition of the
forces in the battle.
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TABLE 4-13-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF KOMANDORSKI
ISLAND
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS




B (JAPAN) 1 NACHI, MAYA
2 ABUKUMA, TAMA, AKABA, HATSUSHIMO
b. Significant Events
Table 4-13-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-13-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF KOMANDORSKI
ISLANDS
TIME EVENT
0842 NACHI and MAYA cpen fire on SALT LAKE
CITY.
SALT LAKE CITY returns fire.
NACHI ceases fire for approximat ',-) 30
minutes.
0915 NACHI resumes fire. NACHI, ILtYA and SALT
LAKE CITY exchange fire intermittently for
several hours.
1150 SALT LAKE CITY ceases fire.
U.S. destroyers close Japanese line in an
attempt to divert fire from badly damaged
SALT LAKE CITY.
1200 SALT LAKE CITY resumes fire.
1210 Japanese break off the engagement.
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c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Duration of Continuous Fire. SALT LAKE CITY
fired 323-8" shells, resulting in an estimated duration of
fire of 21 minutes. BAILEY and COGHLAN together fired 2314-
5" shells, resulting in an estimated duration of fire of seven
minutes. NACHI and MAYA together fired 1611-8" shells,
resulting in an estimated duration of fire of 20 minutes.
(2) Weapon Effoctiveness. SALT LAKE CITY scored
three hits, resulting in an estimated PC of 0.004. BAILEY and
COGHLAN scored one hit, resultirg in an estimated PC of
0.0004. NACHI and MAYA scored six hits, resulting in an
estimated PC of 0.004.
The model's input parameters are summarized in
Tables 4-13-C and 4-13-D. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon
type one (FP1, PPl) is the 21" torpedo with TORPEX warhead.
For the Japanese force, pulse weapon type one (FPl, PP1) is
the 24" "Long Lance" torpedo.
TABLE 4-13-C KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS--STAYING POWER,
THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON
EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FPI PPl SP
A (U.S.) 1 3.34 0.004 1.59
2 6.03 0.0c') 7.01 0.000 1.35
3 5.21 0.0004 46.75 0.000 1.88
4 5.21 0.0004 37.40 0.000 1.80
B (JAPAN) 1 6.97 0.004 24.01 0.000 3.45
2 3.65 0.000 40.02 0.000 4.21
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TABLE 4-13-D KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS
FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 1 1 1 21
2 3,4 1,2 21 7
B (JAPAN) 1 1 1 1 19
2 1 3 21 1
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
SALT LAKE CITY and BAILEY were damaged resulting
in an FC loss interval for the U.S. force of 0.00%-30.13% and
an FP loss interval of 0.00%-25.64%. MAYA was damaged
resulting in an FC loss interval for the Japanese force of
0.00% - 32.84% and an FP loss interval of 0.00% -12.50%.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss
Intervals and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-13-E.
TABLE 4-13-E KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS--COMPARISON OF MODEL
RESULTS WITH THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER LOSS
INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 0.00 5.81 30.13 0.00 0.71 25.64
B (JAPAN) 0.00 4.80 32.84 0.00 2.91 12.50
Since none of the model's results fall outside
the intervals, there is no reason to question them.
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13. Battle of Kula Gulf--06 July 1943
Morison [Ref. 17] and Dull [Ref. 14] were the primary
sources of data on this bettle.
a. Force Disposition
Table 4-14-A summarizes the disposition of the
forces in the battle.
TABLE 4-14-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF KULA GULF
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 HELENA
2 HONOLULU, ST. LOUIS
3 O'BANNON, NICHOLAS, RADFORD, JENKINS
B (JAPAN) 1 NIITSUKI
2 SUZUKAZI, TANIKAZI
3 AMAGIRI, HATSUYUKI, NAGATSUKI,
SATSUKI
b. Significant Events
Table 4-14-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-14-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF KULA GULF
TIME EVENT
0140 U.S. force detects Japanese force.
0157 U.S. cruisers open fire on NIITSUKI.
SUZUKAZI and TANIKAZI fire 16-24"
torpedoes.
0201 U.S. cruisers shift fire to SUZUKAZI and
TANIKAZI.
0203 U.S. column reverses course and ceases
firing.
HELENA hit by 1-24" torpedo.
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0203-0220 U.S. destroyers fire several ineffective
torpedo salvoes.
0218 U.S. cruisers open fire on AMAGIRI,
HATSUYUKI, NAGATSUKI and SATSUKI. Firing
is highly intermittent.
0235 U.S. force ceases fire and breaks off the
engagement.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(.) Duration of Continuous Fire. The U.S.
cruisers fired 2500-6" shells, resulting in an estimated
duration of fire of six minutes.
(2) Weapon Effectiveness. The U.S. cruisers
scored 28 hits resulting in an estimated PC of 0.011.
SUZUKAZI and TANIKAZI fired 16-24" torpedoes and scored three
hits, resulting in an estimated PP of 0.188. No other
platforms fired with any effect in the battle.
All input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-14-C, 4-14-D and 4-14-E. For the U.S. force, pulse weapon
type one (FPl, PPI) is the 21" torpedo with TORPEX warhead.
For the Japanese force, pulse wea-un type one (FPl, PPl) is
the 24" "Long Lance" torpedo.
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TABLE 4-14-C KULA GULF--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FP1 PPl SP
A (U.S.) 1 7.54 0.011 1.62
2 15.08 0.011 3.24
3 10.41 0.000 93.50 0.000 4.04
B (JAPAN) 1 1.70 0.000 8.00 0.000 1.09
2 0.96 0.000 32.01 0.188 1.85
3 1.95 0.000 60.03 0.000 3.62
TABLE 4-14-D KULA GULF--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 1,2 1 17 4
2 1,2 2 21 1
3 2 3 38 1
TABLE 4-14-E KULA GULF--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI E
B (JAPAN) 1 2 1 17 6 32.01
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals.
HELENA suffered a firepower kill in this battle,
resulting in an FC loss value for the U.S. force of 22.83% and
an FP loss value of 0.00%. NIITSUKI was lost in this battle
while SUZUKAZI and TANIKAZI were damaged, resulting in an FC
loss interval for the Japanese force of 36.93% - 57.65% and an
FP loss interval of 8.00%-42.00%.
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e. Comparison of Model Results with Loss Intervals
and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-14-F.
TABLE 4-14-F KULA GULF--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 22.83 22.83 22.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
B (JAPAN) 36.93 39.11 57.65 8.00 14.62 42.00
Since none of the model's values fall outside the
computed intervals, there is no reason to question them.
14. Battle of Vella Gulf--6/7 August 1943
Morison [Ref. 17] and Dull [Ref. 14] were the primary
sources of data on this battle.
a. Force Disposition.
Table 4-15-A summarizes the disposition of Forces
in the battle.
TABLE 4-15-A FORCES INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF VELLA GULF
FORCE GROUP PLATFORMS
A (U.S.) 1 DUNLAP, CRAVEN, MAURY
2 LONG, STERETT, STACK




Table 4-15-B summarizes the battle's significant
events.
TABLE 4-15-B SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE BATTLE OF VELLA GULF
TIME EVENT
2333 U.S. force detects Japanese force.
2341 DUNLAP, CRAVEN, and MAURY fire 24-21"
torpedoes.
2345 HAGIKAZE is hit by two torpedoes ARASHI
by three torpedoes and KAWAKAZE by one.
2345 LONG, STERETT and STACK open fire with 5"
guns. Japanese ships return fire
ineffectively.
STACK fires four torpedoes.
2355 DUNLAP, CRAVEN and MAURY open fire on
ARASHI and KAWAKAZE.
0010 ARASHI blows up.
0018 KAWAKAZE blows up.
SHIGURE withdraws.
c. Computation of Input Parameters
(1) Number of Shells Fired. DUNLAP, CRAVEN and
MAURY fired for 27 minutes, resulting in an estimate of 6143-
5" shells fired. LONG, STERETT and STACK fired for a total of
34 minutes, resulting in an estimate of 7140-5" shells fired.
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(2) Weapon Effectiveness. No data was available
on the number of U.S. shells which hit their targets. The PC
of both groups is, therefore, assumed to be 0.011, the PC of
the U.S. ships at Kula Gulf. DUNLAP, CRAVEN and MAURY fired
24-21" torpedoes and scored six hits, resulting in an
estimated PP of 0.250. No other platforms fired with effect in
this battle.
All input parameters are summarized in Tables
4-15-C, 4-15-D and 4-15-E. For the U. S. force, pulse weapon
type one (FP1, PPl) is the 21" torpedo with TORPEX warhead.
For the Japanese force, pulse weapon type one (FP1, PP1) is
the 24" "Long Lance" torpedo.
TABLE 4-15-C VELLA GULF--STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL
COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVEN"ESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FPI PPI SP
A (U.S.) 1 6.77 0.011 56.10 0.250 2.74
2 6.25 0.011 56.10 0.000 2.76
B (JAPAN) 1 1.43 0.000 48.02 0.000 2.80
2 0.48 0.000 16.01 0.000 0.90
TABLE 4-15-D VELLA GULF--SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 2 1 5 34
2 1 1 12 27
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TABLE 4-15-E VELLA GULF--SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE
ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
A (U.S.) 1 1 1 1 4 1 56.10
d. Computation of Theoretical Combat Power Loss
Intervals
The Japanese force lost KAWAKAZE, ARASHI, and
HAGIKAZE resulting in FC and FP loss values equal to 75.00%.
U.S. platforms suffered no damage in this battle.
e. Comparison of Model Results with the Loss Values
and Conclusions
The results of the comparison are summarized in
Table 4-15-F.
TABLE 4-15-F VELLA GULF--COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH
LOSS INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B (JAPAN) 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00
Since the model's results match the computed
values, there's no reason to question them.
F. VALIDATION'S VALUE IN FINE TUNING THE MODEL
In the model's original design, platforms of each force
were not organized into component groups but were aggregated
together into one group representing the entire force. Each
force was represented by single values of SP, FC, and FP.
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Within the context of the model, therefore, each force fired
as a single unit, unleashing all of its FC and/or FP on its
opponent. in addition, effective combat power inflicted by a
force was distributed evenly across all. platforms of the
opposing force. Testing this early form of the model using
historical data pointed out a serious weakness in the model's
assumptions requiring modification into its present form.
The battle which was used to test the model in its early
form was the Battle of Savo Island. Model input parameters
are summarized in table- 4-16-A, 4-16-B and 4-16-C.
TABLE 4-16-A SAVO ISLAND (FULLY AGGREGATED MODEL)--STAYING
POWER, TFEORETICAL COMBAT POWER AND WEAPON
EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
FORCE GROUP FC PC FP1 PPI FP2 PP2 SP
A (U.S.) 1 27.11 0.037 112.19 0.000 5.51 0.000 18.50
B (JAPAN) 1 11.85 0.090 56.02 0.115 10.90
TABLE 4-16-B SAVO ISLAND (FUItL AGGREGATED MODEL)--
SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF DOF
A (U.S.) 1 1 1 16 1
2 1 1 37 2
B (JAPAN) 1 1 1 5 2
2 1 1 10 5
3 1 1 37 1
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TABLE 4-16-C SAVO ISLAND (FULLY AGGREGATED MODEL)--
SUMMARY OF PULSE FIRE ENGAGEMENTS
FORCE EVENT GF GBA TOF TUI TP E
B (JAPAN) 1 1 2 1 5 1 34.03
2 1 1 10 7 1 32.01
3 1 1 18 7 1 48.02
As can be seen from the tables, the FP and SP values are
simply the sums of the values found in Table 4-8-C. FC,
however, was computed based only on the 8" gun cruisers'
individual FC values since it was the cruisers which fired
with the most effect in the battle. PC for both forces was
estimated from the ratio of the number of 8" shells which hit
their targets to the number fired. Torpedo PP was estimated
as described in the Savo Island analysis above. Times and
duration of continuous and pulse fire were also left
unchanged. Table 4-16-D summarizes the comparison of model
results with the theoretical combat power loss intervals.
TABLE 4-16-D SAVO ISLAND (FULLY AGGREGATED MODEL)--
COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS WITH LOSS
INTERVALS
FORCE LCL % FC UCL LPL % FP UPL
LOST LOST
A (U.S.) 38.89 100.00 43.60 10.49 100.00 21.18
B (JAPAN) 0.00 3.54 39.47 0.00 3.54 37.31
As can be seen in the table, glaring discrepancies exist
between the computed FC and FP loss intervals and the model's
percent FC and FP loss results for the U.S. force.
86
Investigation revealed that these discrepancies stemmed from
the fact that the model was distributing Japanese fire (and
the consequent attrition) over the entire U.S. force. Japanese
fire in the actual battle, however, was focused primarily on
the Northern and Southern Force cruisers. The model, there-
fore, produced results which reflected much higher losses than
were actually sustained by the U.S. force.
The solution to this problem was to enhance the model by
allowing the user to segregate the battle into separate
engagements of component groups. The user was now able to
regulate and focus each group's fire. As can be seen from the
analysis of Savo Island conducted with the enhanced model, a
much better result was produced.
It is obvious that the current, enhanced model allows the
user much greater flexibility in exploring his tactical
options and is a much more realistic portrayal of naval
combat. This, however, was not intuitively obvious at the
outset. It required analysis, using actual battle data, to
discover the problem and correct it. The conclusion,
therefore, is that historical battle data is an extremely
useful tool in the process of model enhancement and
validation.
G. CONCLUSIONS
Concerning the issue of model validation, Hughes [Ref. 19]
has stated the following:
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We see t"n why the analyst is disconcerted when asked
whether he has validated his model. The answer must
always be no. The correct questions are: what steps has
he taken to corroborate his model and over what range of
application can it be shown to be utilitarian.
This chapter has sought to answer the first of these
questions. Of the 40 theoretical combat power loss per-
centages produced by model runs incorporating data from 14
naval battles only two deviated significantly from their
corresponding combat power loss intervals. Investigation
revealed that these deviations were caused by anomalies
peculiar to a particular platform and not to a fundamental
model weakness. The conclusion, therefore, is that the
model's results have been corroborated to be a fair
representation of reality.
The next chapter will address the second question by
demonstrating the model's potential for application as a
tactical planning tool.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL AS A TACTICAL PLANNING TOOL
A. INTRODUCTION
For any battle model to be useful as a tactical decision
aid, it must be simple, credible and applicable to the battle
situations for which the user is developing his tactics. That
this model is simple and credible has already been
demonstrated. This chapter will explore the model's potential
for application as a modern tactical planning tool by using
it to evaluate the U.S. commander's tactical options at the
Battle of Savo Island, a battle which has much in common with
modern naval battle scenarios.
B. TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
1. Composition of the Opposing Forces
Table 5-1 summarizes the staying power and combat
power of the U.S. and Japanese forces at Savo Island.
As is evident from the table, the U.S. force was
overwhelmingly superior in both staying power and combat power
to the Japanese force. Flaws in the U.S. commander's tactical
plan, however, greatly undermined this superiority and gave
the Japanese commander a more than even chance for victory.
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TABLE 5-1 BREAKDOWN OF FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
FORCE SP FC FP
U.S.
Northern Group
3 CA's 4.89 9.03 0.00
2 DD's 1.F4 4.17 24.93
Southern Group
2 CA's 3.31 6.38 0.00
2 DD's 1.84 4.17 24.93
Eastern Group
2 s..L s 2.90 11.70 11.74
2 DD's 1.88 5.21 31.17
Pickets
2 DD's 1.84 4.17 24.93
TOTAL 18.50 44.83 117.70
JAPANESE
5 CA's 7.88 11.85 48.02
2 CL's 2.18 1.92 13.00
1 DD 0.84 0-36 3.33
TOTAL 10.90 14.13 64.35
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2. Tactics of the Opposing Forces
a. U.S. Tactics
The mission of the U.S. force was to protect the
American beachhead on Guadalcanal. To accomplish this, the
U.S. commander organized his force into three groups (Table
5-1), each tasked with protecting a direction of approach to
the American beachhead. The U.S. commander relied on the
(perceived) superiority of his platforms' gunnery to handle
any surface threat.
b. Japanese Tact 4cs
The mission of the Japanese force was to destroy
American supply transports at Guadalcanal, as well as any
naval opposition encountered there. To accomplish his
mission, the Japanese commander organized his force into a
single group in order to initiate his attacks with massed
torpedo salvoes. Gunfire would be used to mop up after the
torpedo attacks.
3. Course and Outcome of the Battle
The Japanese force approa hed Guadalcanal from the
northwest attacking the U.S. group patrolling south of Savo
Island first. The Japanese then turned to the northeast and
attacked the group patrolling north of Savo before breaking
off the engagement. Both U.S. groups were taken by surprise.
The Americans lost four heavy cruisers. One heavy cruiser and
one destroyer were heavily damaged. The Japanese suffered
only slight damage to two of their heavy cruisers.
91
The fundamental flaw in the U.S. tactical plan can be
seen by evaluating Table 5-1 in light of each opponent's
tactics. The U.S. commander's decision to divide his forces
left each U.S. group inferior to the Japanese force even
though the U.S. force was superior in aggregate. The Japanese
commander was able to employ his torpedoes against the
northern and southern American groups separately, devastating
each in turn. Further, the U.S. groups allowed themselves to
be surprised. They were, therefore, unable to inflict any
serious damage on the Japanese.
C. USING THE MODEL TO EVALUATE U.S. TACTICAL OPTIONS
1. U.S. Commander's Estimate of Own and Enemy
Capabilities
U.S. patrol aircraft had located the Japanese force
on the day before the bdttle and had reported its composition
as three heavy cruisers and three destroyers. The U.S.
commander could have used the latest edition of Jane's
FightinQ Ships to determine that the typical Japanese heavy
cruiser mounted six 8" guns, could fire four torpedoes in a
single salvo, and had a full load displacement of
approximately 10,500 tons. A typical Japanese destroyer
mounted four 5" guns, could fire eight torpedoes in a single
salvo, and had a full load displacement of 2200 tons.
Additionally, the U.S. commander might have assumed that the
characteristics of Japanese weapons were roughly similar to
those of their U.S. counterparts.
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Based on his knowledge and assumptions concerning the
Japanese force, the U.S. commander could have estimated its
FC, FP and SP values as in Table 5-2.
TABLE 5-2 U.S. COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE STRENGTH
SP FC FP
3 CA's 4.62 6.02 18.70
3 DD's 2.75 6.25 37.40
TOTAL 7.37 12.27 56.10
The U.S. commander might also have made the following
assumptions about his own and his enemy's capabilities:
- U.S. and Japanese PC = 0.03 (a value which is consistent
with U.S. Naval War College estimates in the 1930's).
- U.S. torpedo PP = 0.05.
- Japanese torpedo PP = 0.10.
The Japanese torpedo PP was assigned a value twice that of the
U.S. under the assumption that the U.S. commander was aware
that the Japanese had employed torpedoes to good effect at the
Battle of Java Sea some months earlier.
2. Developing Scenarios Which Test U.S. Tactical Options
Having estimated enemy strength and capabilities, the
U.S. commander would have used the model to explore his
tactical options. In this spirit, four scenarios were
developed reflecting these options. In each, the Japanese
force is organized into a single group and initiates the
engagement with a torpedo attack.
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a. Scenario One
The U.S. Commander deploys his force as in the
actual battle. The Japanese attack the northern U.S. group
first. The southern U.S. group joins the engagement ten
minutes later. The eastern U.S. group is too far away to join
until after the Japanese escape. None of the U.S. groups
employ torpedoes.
b. Scenario Two
This scenario is identical to scenario one except
that the U.S. groups employ torpedoes as well as gunfire.
C. Scenario Three
The U.S. commander deploys his forces so as to
concentrate his combat power but does not employ torpedoes.
d. Scenario Four
This scenario is identical to scenario three
except that the U.S. force employs torpedoes as well as
gunfire.
3. Computing Model Input Parameters Reflecting Each
Scenario.
Model input parameters were computed representing:
- Actual FC, FP and SP values of the U.S. force (Table 5-
1).
- Estimated FC, FP and SP values of the Japanese force
(Table 5-2)
- Interaction of the opposing forces in each scenario.
Parameters were computed and run twice for each scenario, once
in which the Japanese surprise the U.S. force (S) and once in
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Parameters were computed and run twice for each scenario, once
in which the Japanese surprise the U.S. force (S) and once in
which they fail to achieve surprise (NS). Gunfire did not
commence in either force in those scenarios involving Japanese
surprise attack until the first Japanese torpedo salvo struck
its targets.
4. Model Results for Each Scenario
Table 5-3 summarizes the model's results for each
scenario. Each model run would have taken less than one
second of computing time on a personal computer.
TABLE 5-3 LOSS PERCENTAGES FOR EACH SCENARIO
U.S. FORCES JAPANESE FORCES
SCENARIO SP FC FP SP FC FP
l(NS) 47.69 39.27 33.86 100.00 100.00 100.00
I(S) 74.16 62.28 63.54 69.09 69.09 69.09
2(NS) 45.04 36.97 30.89 100.00 100.00 100.00
2(S) 62.10 51.80 50.02 100.00 100.00 100.0
3(NS) 36.94 36.94 36.94 100.00 100.00 100.00
3(S) 39.63 39.63 39.63 100.00 100.00 100.00
4(NS) 36.94 36.94 36.94 100.00 100.00 100.00
4(S) 39.63 39.63 39.63 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 5-3 clearly shows that the U.S. force fares
worst in the scenario in which its commander divides his
platforms so that they cannot concentrate their combat power,
fails to employ his torpedoes, and allows himself to be
surprised (scenarios 1(S)). The U.S. force fares best in
those scenarios in which its commander concentrates his combat




Using the model to explore and evaluate the U.S.
commander's tactical options at the Battle of Savo Island has
demonstrated its value as a tactical planning tool. The
model's results clearly demonstrated that the scenario in
which the U.S. fo:ce fared the worst was the one which most
closely resembled how the Americans actually fought the
battle. Flaws in the U.S. commander's tactical plans were,
therefore, clearly indicated. Additionally, the model's
results indicated the best alternative: concentrate combat
power and be vigilant. Had the U.S. commander used the model
in the hours prior to the battle, he would have undoubtedly
reevaluated his tactical plans.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A naval battle model has been developed which incorporates
the essence of Hughes' tactical theory. Naval forces are
portrayed as aggregations of the staying power and combat
power of heterogeneous mixes of ships. Attrition is modeled
as a force-on-force process and is suffered via continuous
fire and/or through the impact of pulse weapons. User
variation of inputs concerning the time, strength, target and
duration of each force's fire allows analysis of the impact of
C2 and scouting effectiveness on battle dynamics.
B. DATA COLLECTION AND MODEL VALIDATION
Data was collected on fourteen twentieth century naval
battles in order to compute model input parameters
representing the forces involved in each battle and their
interaction. For each battle, the model was run using the
parameters computed from historical data and the resulting
losses in each force's FC and FP, as predicted by the model,
were recorded. FC and FP loss intervals were computed for
both forces in each battle. The lower limit of a theoretical
combat power loss interval represents the amount of
theoretical combat power (pulse or continuous) carried by all
platforms of a force suffering at least a firepower kill. The
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upper limit represents the amount of theoretical combat power
carried by all platforms of a force suffering at least some
damage. The model was deemed to have produced a credible
result for a battle if its predicted losses in FC and FP for
each force fell within their corresponding loss intervals.
Of the 40 theoretical combat power loss percentages
produced by model runs incorporating data from each of the
fourteen battles, only two deviated significantly from their
corresponding loss intervals. Investigation revealed that
these deviations were anomalies peculiar to a particular
platform in each battle and not to a fundamental model
weakness. The model, therefore, was determined to be a fair
representation of reality.
C. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL AS A PLANNING TOOL
The model's potential for application as a tactical
planning tool was explored by using it to evaluate the
tactical options of the U.S. commander at the Battle of Savo
Island. Model input parameters representing the SP, FC and FP
of the Japanese force were computed based on the U.S.
commander's estimate of its size, composition and capabilities
prior to the battle. Four scenarios were developed, each
representing a variation in U.S. tactics including:
- Concentration of combat power.
- Division of forces to cover all possible geographic
lines of approach available to the Japanese.
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- Employment of torpedoes.
- Implications of a Japanese surprise attack.
Results of model runs of each scenario clearly indicated
that the U.S. commander should have concentrated his combat
power at Savo Island and increased his force's vigilance
against the possibility of surprise attack. Although it was
the U.S. commander's plan to divide his force into three
smaller groups, use of the model prior to the battle would
probably have forced him to rethink his tactics. The model's
utility as a tactical planning tool has, therefore, been
dewonstrated.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Additional study should be conducted Co develop the model
further so that it can be put to practical use by fleet
tacticians. The following are suggested topics of immediate
interest:
- Incorporate modern platforms and weapons into the
survivability analysis. Changes both in weapon
systems and naval architecture since World War Il
make this an essential step in perfecting the model
- Improve the analysis of carrier battles by including
the escort vessels into the aggregations of combat
power and staying power. In particular, an analysis
of their contribution to anti-air warfare with a view
toward enriching the model with the incorporation of
defensive combat power is needed.
- Conduct an analysis of engagements involving carrier
airpower vs. land based airpower to discover if the
miodel can be modified and enriched for use in analysis
of this type of scenario.
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APPENDIX A PLATFORM SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to develop a method of estimating the staying
power of any given platform, it was necessary to gather and
analyze :ata on platforms which had suffered firepower kills
in combat. This appendix describes how the platform
survivability model (Chapter I, equation (1)) was developed
from analysis of a data set of 75 platforms which suffered
firepower kills in World Wars I and II.
B. DATA COLLECTION
To be incorporated into the data set, a platform had to
meet zhree criteria:
- Damage sustained caused a loss in mobility or
firepower sufficient to prevent the platform from
fulfilling its mission in battle.
- Damage sustained was not sufficient to sink the
platform or warrant its destruction by friendly
forces.
- Extent of damage was not such that "it took a miracle"
to save it.
The first criterion ensures selection of platforms which
suffered firepower kills while the second and third criteria
reduce the number of platforms in the data set which sustained
more damage than necessary to inflict a firepower kill.
The raw data collected for each platform in the data set
included:
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- Platform full load displacement.
- TNT explosive weight of each type of weapon which
damaged the platform.
- Number of hits of each type of weapon which damaged
the platform.
Table A-1 summarizes the data used in this analysis.
C. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The goal of the analysis was to model the number of
standard weapon hits necessary to inflict a firepower kill on
a platform as a function of that platform's full load
displacement:
Ni  = a + b x f(dj) (1)
where
N; = number of standard weapon hits necessary
to inflict a firepower kill on platform
i.
f(di) = function of the full load displacement of
platform i (d i ).
a,b = coefficients of the linear model.
Using f(di) as the explanatory variable in the model was
intuitively appealing since it is reasonable to assume that
the amount of protection and watertight integrity built into
a platform is reflected in some degree by its full load
displacement.
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TABLE A-I PLATFORM SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS DATA BASE
FULL TNT
LOAD EXPL #
NAME DISPL. DATE WEAPON WGT HITS
PLATFORMS DAMAGED BY TORPEDOES
SCHARNHORST (G) 38900 08JUL40 21" MKIX(GB) 727 1
GNEISENAU (G) 38900 08APR41 18" MKXII(GB) 387 1
VENETO (I) 45029 27MAR41 18" MKXII(GB) 387 3
LITTORIO (I) 45236 11NOV40 18" MKXII(GB) 387 3
VENETO (I) 45029 15NOV41 21" MKVIII(GB) 722 1
INDEPENDENCE (US) 14751 20NOV43 18" TY91(J) 576 1
INTREPID (US) 34881 17FEB44 18" TY91(J) 576 1
ARETHUSA (GB) 7400 15NOV42 18" LTI (G) 571 1
FIJI (GB) 10450 01SEP40 21" G7ET2(G) 858 1
LIVERPOOL (GB) 11650 30OCT40 21" G7ET2(G) 858 1
NEW ORLEANS (US) 12463 30NOV42 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
HOUSTON (US) 14131 16OCT44 18" TY97 (J) 576 2
DENVER (US) 14131 13NOV43 18" TY97 (J) 576 1
LUTZOW (G) 16100 25JUN40 21" MKVIII(GB) 722 1
NURNBERG (G) 8400 13DEC39 21" MKVIII(GB) 722 1
GLASGOW (GB) 11350 01DEC40 17.7" LT1 (G) 571 2
COVENTRY (GB) 5240 31MAY41 21" G7ET2 (G) 858 1
CAPETOWN (GB) 5180 15FEB41 21" G7ET2 (G) 858 1
MANCHESTER (GB) 11650 23JUL41 17.7" LTI (G) 571 1
PHOEBE (GB) 6850 23OCT42 17.7" LTI (G) 571 1
CLEOPATRA (GB) 6850 21AUG43 21" G7ET5 (G) 788 1
CHICAGO (US) 11420 08AUG42 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
PENSACOLA (US) 11512 30NOV42 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
ST LOUIS (US) 12207 12JUL43 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
KUMANO (J) 11000 20JUL43 22.4" MK13(US) 865 1
AGANO (J) 8534 11NOV43 22.4" MK13(US) 865 1
,,YOKO (J) 13668 25OCT44 21" MK14 (US) 964 1
KUMANO (J) 11000 25OCT44 21" MK15 (US) 1234 1
TAMA (J) 5832 25OCT44 22.4" MK13 (US) 865 1
KEARNEY (GB) 2395 16OCT41 21" G7ET2 (G) 858 1
HAMBLETON (GB) 2395 11NOV42 21" G7ET2 (G) 858 1
SELFRIDGE (US) 2597 06OCT43 21" TY95 (J) 873 1
KELLY (GB) 2348 09MAY40 21" G7ET2 (G) 858 1
KISUMI (J) 2370 05JUL42 21" MK14 (US) 642 1
HATSUKAZI (J) 1900 10JAN43 21" MK14 (US) 642 1
PORTLAND (US) 12755 12NOV42 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
JUNEAU (US) 8340 12NOV42 24" TY93 (J) 1056 1
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TABLE A-I PLATFORM SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS DATA BASE (continued)
PLATFORMS DAMAGED BY BOMBS
ITALIA (I) 45236 09SEP43 FX 1400 (G) 732 1
ILLUSTRIOUS (GB) 29240 19JUN41 500kg AP (G) 209 9.5
1000kg AP (G) 348 1
SHOKAKU (J) 32105 08MAY42 10001b HC (US) 660 2
ZUIKAKU (J) 32105 19JUN44 lO001b HC (US) 660 4
SHOKAKU (J) 32105 26OCT42 lO001b HC (US) 660 4
ZUIHO (J) 14200 26OCT42 5001b HC (US) 307 2
RYUHO (J) 16700 19MAR45 5001b HC (US) 307 3
AMAGI (J) 22800 24JUL45 10001b HC (US) 660 3
UGANDA (GB) 10450 11SEP43 FX1400 (G) 732 1
MARBLEHEAD (US) 7050 04FEB42 250kg SAP (J) 147 2.5
-IOGAMI (J) 13230 04JUN42 5001b HC (US) 307 4
iAYA (J) 15781 '2NOV43 5001b HC (US) 307 1
NAGANA-MI (J) 2520 lNOV43 5001b HC (US) 307 1.5
SHAW (US) 1110 07DEC41 250kg SAP (J) 147 3
MAYRANT (GB) 2250 26JUL43 500kg (G) 211 .5
MINEGUMO (J) 2370 05OCT42 5001b HC (US) 307 1
MATSUYAKI (J) 2389 170CT42 5001b HC (US) 307 1
ISONAMI (J) 2389 01DEC42 5001b HC (US) 307 1.5
NOWAKI (J) 2500 07DEC42 5001b HC (US) 307 1.5
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TABLE A-I PLATFORM SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS DATA BASE (continued)
PLATFORMS DAMAGED BY GUNFIRE
SCHARNHORST (G) 38900 23DEC43 14"/45 MKVII(G) 127 13
SOUTH DAKOTA (US) 44519 14NOV42 14"45 (J) 110 1
8"/50 II (J) 23 18
6" (J) 12 5
5"/40 (J) 4 1
HIEI (J) 31785 12NOV42 8"/55 MK12 (US) 21 12
5"/38 MK12 (US) 8 38
VON DER TANN (G) 21700 31MAY16 15"/42 MKI (GB) 153 2
13.5"/45 (GB) 112 2
WARSPITE (GB) 31500 31MAY6 12" SKL 50 66 13
11" SKL 50 50 2
EXETER (GB) 10490 13DEC39 11"/54 C28 (G) 49 7
AOBA (J) 10651 12OCT42 5"/25 MKI0 (US) 8 3
8"/55 MK12 (US) 21 40
BOISE (US) 12207 120CT42 8"/5011 (J) 23 4
51/50 (J) 4 1
SAN FRANCISCO (US) 12463 12NOV42 14"/45 (J) 110 2
5.5"/50 (J) 4 43
ONSLOW (GB) 2270 24DEC42 8"/60 C34 (G) 15 3
RALPH TALBOT (US) 2245 08AUG42 8"/50 II (J) 23 4
AARON WARD (US) 2395 12NOV42 5"/40 (J) 4 1
ACASTA (GB) 1300 31MAY16 6" SKL 45 (G) 7 2
BROKE (GB) 1250 31MAY16 6" SKL 45 (G) 7 2
4" SKL 45 (G) 3 7
ONSLOW (GB) 1250 31MAY16 4" SKI, 45 (G) 3 2
DEFENDER (GB) 990 31MAY16 12" SKI, 50 (G) 66 1
GWIN (US) 2395 14NOV42 5.5" 50 (J) 8 3
NORFOLK (US) 14600 23DEC43 11"/54 C28 (G) 49 2
EXETER (GB) 11000 27FEB42 8"/50 II (J) 23 1
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D. DATA ANALYSIS
2. Computing the Explanatory and Response Variables
The first step in the process of data analysis was to
compute the explanatory variables, f(di), and the response
variables, N,, from the raw data.
a. Explanatory Variables
Several functions of d, were evaluated such as:
f(d) = d 112  (2)
f(di) = di1/ 3  (3)
f(di) = ln d, (4)
A set of explanatory variables, (f(di)), was computed from the raw
data set, (d,), for each function under consideration.
b. Response Variables
The standard weapon chosen for the analysis was the
U.S. World War II vintage 1000 pound heavy case bomb. This bomb
carried a warhead with explosive weight equal to 660 pounds of TNT.
Raw data on the number of hits of particular weapons received by
each platform in the data set were converted into the number of
TPBE hits received as follows:




N = # TPBE hits taken by platform i
in the data set.
weight = TNT explosive weight of weapon j
taken by platform i.
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Nij= # hits of weapon j taken by
platform i (a near miss which
caused damage was considered 0.5
of a hit).
Wt = weight assigned whose value is
determined by whether weapon j is
a bomb, torpedo, or shell.
Examples of weapon "weight schemes" considered
include:
1.0 for bombs 1.0 for bombs
Wt = 1.25 for shells or Wt 1.25 for torpedoes
1.5 for torpedoes 2.5 for shells
Sets of response variables, (Ni), were computed from the raw
data set using each weight scheme considered.
2. Analysis Procedure
Scatter plots were examined. Each scatter plot paired
a particular (f(di)} with a (Ni computed using a particular
weighting scheme. A set of ordered pairs, (f(d 1 ), Ni), was put
aside for further analysis if visual examination of its
scatter plot indicated a possible linear relationship between
f(d,) and Ni.
For each set of ordered pairs set aside, a model was
constructed in the form of equation (1). Least squares
estimates of the coefficients (a) and (b) were computed. A
model was given further consideration if:
- A 95% confidence interval on the estimate of (a)
included zero.
- A 95% confidence interval on the estimate of (b) did
not include zero.
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This result indicated that there was a linear relationship
between Ni and f(d,) wnile at the same time allowed formulation
of a model of the form:
Ni  = b x f(dj) (6)
This model is much more appealing than equation (1)
because it implies that the number of TPBE hits necessary to
inflict a firepower kill on a platform whose di equals zero is
zero rather than a constant (a) greater than zero.
For each model still under consideration, a chi-square
goodness-of-fit test was performed on its residuals to test:
Ho: ei  Z N (0, a)
A model was given further consideration if the
significance level of the test was greater than 0.05.
The final test performed on the remaining candidate
models involved further visual analysis. For each model,
scatter plots of data points for each weapon category (bomb,
torpedo, and shell) were superimposed on a plot of the model
line. The model selected was the one in which it appeared
that the data points for each weapon type were most randomly
scattered about the line.
3. Final Model
The function of full load displacement and the weapon
weight scheme incorporated into the model are:
f(d) = (di)'13  (7)
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1.0 for bombs
Wt = 1.25 for torpedoes (8)
2.5 for shells
Table A-2 summarizes the least squares estimates and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients (a)
and (b) for the model incorporating (7) and (8).
TABLE A-2 LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF MODEL COEFFICIENTS
95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS
PARAMETERS LSE LOWER UPPER
a -0.313 -0.958 0.331
b 0.083 0.055 0.111
Since (a) 's confidence interval includes zero, it's
estimate was set equal to zero and the LSE of (b) was
recomputed. The final form of this model, therefore, is:
Ni  = 0.070369 x (d,)113  (9)
The chi-square goodness of fit test on the model's
residuals yielded a significance level of 0.196. Figure 1 is
a scatter plot of the set of ordered pairs {(d I3, N1))
superimposed over the model line.
4. Model Weaknesses
Figures 2, 3, and 4 are scatter plots of those
platforms in the data set damaged by bombs, torpedoes, and
shells respectively overlaid on the model line.
While the data points appear, in all three cases, to
be fairly evenly scattered around the model line, there are
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some problems. From Figure 3, it is clear that larger
platforms suffer more heavily from torpedoes than predicted by
the model. From Figure 4, it is clear that small platforms
suffer more heavily from gunfire than predicted by the model.
Figure 3 also clearly indicates that there exists some bias in
the data set as a result of overkill of smaller platforms.
Those destroyers which suffered firepower kills as a result of
a hit by a torpedo with high explosive yield would probably
have been killed by a torpedo with lower yield. It was not
possible to remove these sources of bias without making the
survivability model too complicated to be incorporated into
the naval battle model.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis indicates that the model will
produce reasonable results. It is important to bear in mind
that the purpose of the analysis was not to draw any firm
conclusions about platform staying power. Its purpose was to
produce a credible estimate of staying power to be used as a
battle model input.
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APPENDIX B WEAPON AND PLATFORM DATA BASE
A. SUMMARY
The following tables (Tables B-1 through B-18) incorporate
the weapon and platform characteristics used in the model
validation process described in Chapter IV. Table B-1 lists
common warhead explosives and their ballistic mortar strength
values. These values were used to convert the explosive
weight of a particular warhead into the equivalent explosive
weight in pounds of TNT. All explosive weigi~ts are expressed
in terms of the number of pounds of TNT necessary to produce
the yield of the weapon's warhead.
Heavy and medium calire guns could fire both armor
piercing (AP) and high capacity (HC) shells. These sheLls
were often employed interchangeably in battle. HC shells had
higher explosive weights than AP shells which compensated for
their lack of the armor piercing characteristics.
The explosive weights assigned to shells in these tables
are those of the HC shells. They were used since their
destructive power was determined almost exclusively by the
sizes of their explosive charges (without the additional
factor of the armor piercing characteristic). Their
destructive power, therefore, was more easily quantified than
those of AP shells.
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The following abbreviations are used throughout:
EW = TNT-equivalent explosive weight of warhead.
ROF = gun's rate of fire in rounds per minute.














TABLE B-2 GUN DATA
NATIONALITY SIZE/ DESIGNATION EXPL. EW ROF
CALIBRE
WORLD WAR I
BRITISH 13.5"/45 MKV TNT 111.76 1.5
12.0"/45 MKX TNT 67.76 2.0
9.2" TNT 30.38 4.0
6.0"/50 MKXIV TNT 7.99 7.0
6.0"/45 MKVII TNT 7.99 7.0
GERMAN 12.0" SKL 50 TNT 66.37 1.0
11.1" SKL 50 TNT 49.50 1.5
8.2" SKL 45 TNT 17.82 4.0
5.9" SKL 45 TNT 7.48 7.0
4.1" SKL 45 TNT 2.86 20.0
WORLD WAR II
BRITISH 8.0" MKVIII Shellite 20.43 5.5
6.0" BL MKXI Shellite 7.99 5.0
GERMAN 11.0 SKC 28 TNT 49.17 3.5
UNITED STATES 16.0"/45 MK6 TNT 161.19 2.0
8.0"/55 MK12 TNT 22.07 4.0
6.0"/52 MK16 TNT 13.61 9.8
5.0"/38 MK12 TNT 7.85 17.5
JAPAN 14.0"/45 Type 91 110.00 1.8
8.0"/50 II Type 91 23.01 4.0
5.5"/50 Picric 8.45 6.0
Acid
5.0"/50 Type 91 4.20 7.5
4.7" Type 91 6.58 10.0
4.0"/65 Type 91 3.12 18.0
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TABLE B-3 TORPEDO AND BOMB DATA
NATIONALITY SIZE DESIGNATION EXPLOSIVE EW
TORPEDOES
BRITISH 21.0" MKIX TNT 727.10
UNITED STATES 22.4" MK13 TNT 400.40
22.4" MK13 TORPEX 864.60
21.0" MK15 TNT 822.80
21.0" MK15 TORPEX 1234.20
JAPANESE 24.0" Type 93 Mod I Type 97 1056.44
21.0" 6 year type TNT 440.00
18.0" Type 91 Mod 2 Type 98 491.59
BOMBS
UNITED STATES 1000 lb. MK 9/ Amatol 660.00
Heavy Case
500 lb. MK 12/ Amatol 307.36
Heavy Case
JAPANESE 250 kg. Type 99 SAP Type 91 142.70
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TABLE B-4 AIRCRAFT DATA
NATIONALITY NAME DESIGN- WEAPON
ATION LOAD-OUT
UNITED STATES DAUNTLESS SBD-3 1-1000 lb.
HC Bomb
DAUNTLESS(Scout) SBD-3 1-500 lb.
HC Bomb.
DEVASTATOR TBD-1 1-22.4"1 Torpedo
AVENGER TBF-l 1-22.4"1 Torpedo
JAPAN VAL D3Al 11 1-250 kg. SAP
Bomb
KATE B5Nl 12 1-18"1 Torpedo
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TABLE B-5 CORONEL--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME MAIN BATTERY DISPL.
GUNS (f.1. tcrn)
BRITISH GOOD HOPE 2-9.2", 16-6"/45 MKVII 14150
MONMOUTH 14-6.0"/45 MKVII 9800
GLASGOW 2-6.0"/50 MKXIV 5300
GERMAN SCHARNHORST 8-8.2" SKL 45 12781
GNEISENAU 8-8.2" SKL 45 12781
LEIPZIG 10-4.1' SKL 45 4268
DRESDEN 10-4.1" SKL 45 3756
TABLE B-6 FALKLAND ISLANDS--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME MAIN BATTERY DISPL.
GUNS ( f. 1. Tons)
BRITISH INVINCIBLE 8-12.0"/45 MKX 20078
INFLEXIBLE 8-12.0"/45 MKX 20078
GERMANS SCHARNHORST 8-8.2" SKL 45 12781
GNEISENAU 8-8.2" SKL 45 12781
TABLE B-7 DOGGER BANK--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME MAIN BATTERY DISPL.
GUNS (f.1. tans)
BRITISH LION 8-13.5"/45 MKV 29680
PRINCESS ROYAL 8-13.5"/45 MKV 29680
TIGER 8-13.5"/45 MKV 35710
NEW ZEALAND 8-12.0"/45 MKX 22080
INDOMITABLE 8-12.0"/45 MKX 20078
GERMAN SEYDLITZ 10-11.1" SKL 50 28100
DERFFLINGER 8-12.0" SKL 50 30700
MOLTKE 10-11.1" SKL 50 25300
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TABLE B-8 RIVER PLATE--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME MAIN BATTERY DISPL.
GUNS ( f. 1. tons)
BRITISH EXETER 6-8" MK VIII 10490
AJAX 8-6" BL MKXI 9280
ACHILLES 8-6" BL MKXI 9280
GERMAN GRAF SPEE 6-11" SKC 28 16200
TABLE B-9 CORAL SEA--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME AIRCRAFT DISPL.
(f.1. tons)











TABLE B-10 MIDWAY--PLATFORM DATA
NATIONALITY NAME AIRCRAFT DISPL.
(f .1. taCr.)
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APPENDIX C PROGRAM LISTING AND SAMPLE OUTPUT FILE
A. PROGRAM LISTING
This program incorporates the naval battle model described
in Chapter II. It was coded in FORTRAN 77 and implemented on
the Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 3033 AP mainframe
computer.
PROGRAM BATTLE
* THIS PROGRAM INCORPORATES A FORCE-ON-FORCE ATTRITION MODEL
* OF NAVAL C11NBAT. THE USER COMPUTES INPUT PARAMETERS
* REPRESENTING THE AGGREGATE STAYING POWER, THEORETICAL COMBAT
* POWER AND WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES. THESE *
* VALUES ARE INPUTTED INTO THE PROGRAM ALONG WITH PARAMETERS
* REPRESENTING THE INTERACTION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE
* DESIRED BATTLE SCENARIO. THE MODEL'S RESULTS ARE EXPRESSED
* IN TERMS OF THE % STAYING POWER AND THEORETICAL COMBAT
* POWER LOST BY EACH FORCE.
INTEGER GA, GB, NWA, NUB, FIRECA(20), FIRECB(20), DURCA(2O),
*DURCS(20), FIREPA(20), FIREPB(20), NFAP, NFBP, SHTPA(1D),
*SHTPB(1O), NBPF(1D), NAPF(1O), IMPA(20), IMPB(20), TGTPAi20,l0),
.TGTPB(20,1D), PA, PB, JPA, JPB, NFA(1O), NFB(1O), SHTCAC2O,10),
+SHTCB(20.1O), NACF(1O), NBCF(1O), TGTCA(20.1O), TGTCB(20,1O),
+STOPCA(20), STOPCB(20), CA, JCA, CB, JCB, A, G, H, HA, HB, 1, K,
+L1, M, N
REAL SA(1O), SeBlO), SAD, SBO, FCA(1O), FCB(1O), FPA(1O,1O),
+FPB(1O,1O), PCA(1O), PCB(1O), TOTPFP, PULSEA(20), PULSEB(2O),
+PPA(20), PPB(20), LA(1O), LB(1O), SP, LPA(10), LPB(1O), LCA(1O),
*LCB(1O), L, FC, SATOT, SBTOT, FCATOT, FCBTOT, FPATOT, FPBTOT,
+TLSA, TLSB, TLCA, TLCB, TLPA, TLPB, FPAO, FPBO, FCAO, FCBO,
*SPA. BPB
DATA Fii-C.% FIRECB, DURCA, DURCS /20*0, 20*0, 20*0, 20*0/
DATA FIREPA, FIREPS, NBPF, NAPF /20*0. 20*0, 0*0, 10*0/
DATA IMPA, IMPB, NFA, NFB, NACF /20-0, 20*0, 10*O, 0*0, 10*0/
DATA NBCF, STOPCA, STOPCB, SHTPA /10*0. 20*0, 2GjvD, 10*0/
DATA SHTPB, SA, SB, FCA, FCB /10*0, 10-0, 0*0, 10-0, 10*0/
DATA PCA, PCB, LA, LB, IPA /10-0, 0*0, 10*0, 10*0, 10*0/
DATA LPB, LCA, LCI, PULSEA, PUILSEB /10*0, 10*0, 10*0, 20-0, 20*0/
DATA PPA, PPB /20*0. 20*0/
DATA SJ4TCA, SHTCB, TGTCA, TGTCU /200*0, 200-0, 200-0, 200*0/








PRINT', 'ENTER THE FOLLOWING:'
PRINT*
PRINT-, 'NUMBER OF GROUPS INTO WHICH A AND 8 ARE DIVIDED.'
READ*, GA, G8
PRINT', 'STAYING P06ER OF EACH A GROUP.'
READ', (SA(I), I a 1, GA)
PRINT', 'STAYING POER OF EACH B GROUP.'
READ', (SB(I), I a 1, GB)
DO 10 I a 1, GA
SAO - SAO + SA(M)
10 CONTINUE
DO 20 I - 1, GB
Sao a SBO + SB(I)
20 CONTINUE
PRINT', 'THEORETICAL CONTINUOUS COMBAT POWER OF EACH A GROUP.'
DO 21 1 = 1, GA
READ', FCA(I)
FCAO = FCAO + FCA(I)
21 CONTINUE
PRINT', 'THEORETICAL CONTINUOUS COMBAT POWER OF EACH B GROUP.'
DO 22 1 = 1, GB
READ', FC8(I)
FCBO = FCBO + FCB(I)
22 CONTINUE
PRINT-, 'NUMBER OF PULSED WEAPONS TYPES IN FORCES A AND B.'
READ', NWA, NW6
IF (NWA.EQ.O) GOTO 31
PRINT-, 'THEORETICAL PULSE COMBAT POWER'
PRINT', 'OF EACH PULSE WEAPON IN A:'
PRINT'
00 30 1 a i, GA
PRINT', 'GROUP ', I
Do 23 1 x 1, NWA
READ*, FPA(I,J)
FPAO a FPAO + FPA(I,J)
23 CONTINUE
30 CONTINUE
IF (NWB.EQ.O) GOTO 45
PRINT', 'THEORETICAL PULSE COMBAT POWER'
PRINT*, 'OF EACH PULSE WEAPON IN 8:'
PRINT'
DO 40 1 = 1, GB
PRINT*, 'GROUP ', I
DO 31 J = 1, NWB
READ', FPB(I,J)
FPBO z FPBO + FPB(I,J)
31 CONTINUE
40 CONTINUE
45 PRINT', 'DOES THIS ENGAGEMENT INCLUDE CONTINUOUS FIRE?'
PRINT', '(1 IF YES, 0 IF NO)Y
READ', A
IF (A.EQ.O) GOTO 80
PRINT', 'ENTER CONTINUOUS WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS'
PRINT', 'FOR EACH A GROUP.'
READ', (PCA(I), I " 1, GA)
PRINT', 'ENTER CONTINUOUS WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS'
PRINT', 'FOR EACH B GROUP.'
READ*, (PCB(I), I x 1, GB)
PRINT', 'ENTER THE NUMBER OF TIMES A WILL EMPLOY'
PRINT', 'CONTINUOUS FIRE (INCLUDING 0).'
READ-, N
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IF (M.LE.O) GOTO 60
PRINT-, 'ENTER THE INCREMENTS AT WHICH A WILL OPEN'
PRINT*, 'CONTINUOUS FIRE AND THE DURATION OF FIRE.$
DO 50 I a 1, M
READ*, FIRECA(I), DURCA(I)
50 CONTINUE
60 PRINT*, 'ENTER THE NUMBER OF TIMES B WILL EMPLOY'
PRINT*, 'CONTINUOUS FIRE (INCLUDING 0).'
READ*, N
IF (M.LE.O) GOTO 80
PRINT', 'ENTER THE INCREMENTS AT WHICH B WILL OPEN'
PRINT', 'CONTINUOUS FIRE AND THE DURATION OF FIRE.'
DO 70 1 a 1, M
READ*, FIRECB(I), DURCS(I)
70 CONTINUE
80 PRINT*, 'DOES THIS ENGAGEMENT INCLUDE PULSED FIRE?'
PRINT*, '(1 IF YES, 0 IF NO).'
READ*, A
IF (A.EQ.O) GOTO 100
PRINT*, 'ENTER THE NUMBER OF TIMES A WILL FIRE (INCLUDING 0).'
READ*, M
IF (M.EQ.O) GOTO 90
PRINT', 'ENTER THE TIME INCREMENTS -7 WHICH A WILL OPEN FIRE.'
READ*, (FIREPA(i), I = 1, M)
90 PRINT*, 'ENTER THE NUMBER OF TIMES B WILL FIRE (INCLUDING 0).'
READ*, M
IF (M.EQ.O) GOTO 100
PRINT', 'ENTER THE TIME INCREME:S AT WHICH B WILL OPEN FIRE.'
READ*, (FIREPB(I), I = 1, M)
100 PRINT*, 'DO YOU WISH TO KNOW:'
PRINT*
PRINT*, 'THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE AFTER A GIVEN NUMBER OF'
PRINT*, 'INCREMENTS? (1 IF YES, 0 IF NO).'
READ*, A
IF (A.EQ.1) GOTO 110
PRINT', 'THE OUTCOME OF A FIGHT TO A PREDETERMINED'
PRINT*, '% LOSS IN STAYING POWER?'
PRINT*, '(1 IF YES, 0 IF NO).'
READ', A
IF (A.EQ.1) GOTO 120
STOP
110 PRINT*, 'ENTER THE NUMBER OF INCREMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED.'
READ*, N
BPA = 2 - 3
BPB = 2 - 3
GOTO 121
120 N = 1000
PRINT*, 'ENTER THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE % LOSS IN STAYING'
PRINT*, 'POWER OF FORCE A.'
READ-, SPA
SPA = SAO - ((BPA / 100) * SAO)
PRINT*, 'ENTER THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE X LOSS IN STAYING'
PRINT*, '-PER OF FORCE B.1
READ*, BPB
BPB = SBO - ((BPS / 100) * SBO)
121 WRITE (7,130) 'INITIAL STRENGTH', SAO, FCAO, FPAO, SBO, FCBO, FPBO

























DO 390 I = 1, N
140 IF (FIREPA(JPA).EQ.I) THEN
PRINT*, 'FORCE A IS FIRING A PULSE.'
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY INCREMENTS UNTIL IT REACHES ITS TARGET?'
READ-, K
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE A ARE FIRING?'
READ*, NFAP
PRINT*, 'WHICH GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ*, (SHTPA(H), H = 1, NFAP)
PRINT*, 'WHICH PULSED WEAPON TYPE IS TO BE FIRED?'
READ*, Li
DO 145 H : 1, NFAP
TOTPFP = TOTPFP + FPA(SHTPA(H), Li)
145 CONTINUE
PRINT*, 'THESE GROUPS CAN FIRE ',TOTPFP,' UNITS.'
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY UNITS ARE THEY GOING TO FIRE?'
READ*, PULSEA(PA)
PRINT*, 'WHAT IS THE WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PULSE?'
READ*, PPA(PA)
PRINT*, 'NOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE B ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ*, NBPF (PA)
PRINT*, 'WHICH GROUPS ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ*, (TGTPA(PA,H), H = 1, NBPF(PA))
IMPA(PA) = I + K - 1
TOTPFP = 0
PA = PA + 1
JPA = JPA + 1
GOTO 140
END IF
150 IF (FIREPB(JPB).EO.I) THEN
PRINT-, 'FORCE B IS FIRING A PULSE.'
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY INCREMENTS UNTIL IT REACHES ITS TARGET?'
READ*, K
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE B ARE FIRING?'
READ*, NFBP
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ*, (SHTPB(H), H = 1, NFBP)
PRINT*, 'WHICH PULSED WEAPON TYPE IS TO BE FIRED?'
READ*, Li
DO 155 H = 1, NFBP
"TOTPFP TOTPFP + FPB(SHTPB(H), LI)
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155 CONTINUE
PRINT-, 'THESE GROUPS CAN FIRE ',TOTPFP,' UNITS.'
PRINT-, 'HOW MANY UNITS ARE THEY GOING TO FIRE?'
READ-, PULSEB(PB)
PRINT-, 'WHAT IS THE WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PULSE?'
READ*, PPB(PB)
PRINT*, 'HOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE A ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', NAPF(PB)
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', (TGTPB(PB,H), H - 1, NAPF(PS))
IMPB(PB) m I + K-1
TOTPFP z 0
PS PBE +
JPB zJPB + 1
GOTO 150
END IF
160 IF (FIRECA(JCA).EQ.I) THEN
PRINT', 'FORCE A IS COMMENCING CONTINUOUS FIRE.'
PRINT', 'HOW MANY GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ', NFA(CA)
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ', (SHTCA(CA,H), H =1, NFA(CA))
PRINT', 'HOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE B ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', NBCF(CA)
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', (TGTCA(CA,H), H = 1, NBCF(CA))
STOPCA(CA) =I + (DURCA(JCA) - 1)
CA CA + 1
JCA =JCA + 1
GOTO 160
END IF
170 IF (FIRECB(JCB).EQ.I) THEN
PRINT', 'FORCE B IS COMMENCING CONTINUOUS FIRE.'
PRINT', 'NOW M4ANY GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ', NFS(CB)
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE FIRING?'
READ', (SHTCB(CB,H), H = 1, NFS(CB))
PRINT', 'HOW MANY GROUPS OF FORCE A ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', NACF(CB)
PRINT', 'WHICH GROUPS ARE BEING FIRED UPON?'
READ', (TGTCB(CB,H), H = 1, NACFCCB))
STOPCB(CB) =I + (DURCB(JCB) - 1)
C8 CB + 1
JCB JCB + 1
GOTO 170
END IF








200 IF (INPA(HA).EQ.I) THEN
00 210 H =1, NBPF(HA)
SP z SP + SB(TGTPA(HA,H))
210 CONTINUE
CALL PFIRE(L, SP, PPA(HA), PULSEA(HA))
DO 220 H z 1, NBPF(HA)
LPB(TGTPA(HA,H)) = LPB(TGTPA(HA,H)) + L
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220 CONTINUE





230 IF (INPB(HB).EQ.I) THEN
Do 240 H a 1, KAPF(NB)
SP a SP + SA(TGTPB(HB,N))
240 CONTINUE
CALL PFIRE(L, SP, PPB(HB), PULSEB(HB))
DO 250 H a 1. NAPF(HB)







DO 290 H = 1, CA
IF (STOPCA(H).GE.1) THEN
DO 260 G = 1, NFA(H)
FC = FC + FCA(SHTCA(H,G)) * PCA(SHTCA(HG))
260 CONTINUE
DO 270 G 1 , NBCF(H)
SP = SP + SB(TGTCA(H,G))
270 CONTINUE
CALL CFIRE(L, SP, FC)
DO 280 G = 1, NBCF(H)







DO 330 H = 1, CB
IF (STOPCB(H).GE.I) THEN
DO 300 G = 1, NFB(H)
FC = FC + FCB(SHTCS(H,G)) * PCB(SHTCB(H,G))
300 CONTINUE
DO 310 G = 1, NACF(H)
SP = SP + SA(TGTCB(H,G))
310 CONTINUE
CALL CFIRE(L, SP, FC)
DO 320 G = 1, NACF(H)







DO 350 H v 1, GA
LA(H) LCACH) + LPA(H)
IF (LA(H).GT.1) LA(M) = 1
CALL TOTATT (LA(H), FCA(H), SA(M))
Do 340, G a 1, NWA
CALL PULATT(LA(H), FPA(H,G))
FPATOT a FPATOT + FPA(H,G)
340 CONTINUE
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SATOT z SATOT + SAMH
FCATOT FCATOT + FCA(H)
350 CONTINUE
DO 370 N z 1, GB
LICH) z LCB(H) + LPB(H)
IF CLB(H).GT.1) LB(H) z I
CALL T0TATT (LB(H), FCB(H), 58(H))
DO 360, G a1, NWB
CALL PULATT(LB(H), FPB(N,G))
FPSTOT a FPBTOT + FPB(H,G)
360 CONTINUE
SBTOT :SSTOT + SB(H)
FC8TOT =FCBTOT + FC8(H)
370 CONTINUE
WRITE (7,380) 1, SATOT, FCATOT, FPATOT, SBTOT, FCSTOT, FPBTOT
380 FORMAT OlX, 14, 6(2X, F7.3))
IF ((SATOT.LE.BPA).OR.(SBTOT.LE.BPB)) GOTO 395








395 TLSA = (0 (SATOT/SAO)) * 100
TLSB ( 0 (SBTOT/SBO)) * 100
IF (FCAO.GT.O) THEN




















WRITE (6,400) ISJ4MARY OF LOSSES (% LOST)I,TLSA,TLCA,TLPA,TLS8,
+TLCB,TLPS







SUBROUTINE CFIRECL, SP, FC)
R EAL L, SP, FCIF (SP.GT.0) THEN






SUBROUTINE PFIRE(L, SP, PP, PULSE)
REAL L, SP, PP. PULSE







SUBROUTINE TOTATT(L, FC, S)
REAL L, FC, S
FC = C - (1 - L)









B- SAMPLE OUTPUT FILE
This file listing is the program's output for the model
run of the Battle of Coronel discussed in Chapter IV. At the
top of the listing are printed the initial SP, FC, and FP
values for forces A and B. The body of the listing includes
the SP, FC and FP values of both forces at each time-step (I).
At the bottom of the listing are the loss percentages for both
forces at the end of the engagement.
INITIAL STRENGTH
SA FCA FPA SB FC6 FPB
4.44 7.69 0.00 5.53 8.65 j.00
FORCE STRENGTH AT EACH ITERATION
SA FCA FPA SB FCB FPB
1 4.319 7.416 0.000 5.530 8.650 0.000
2 4.198 7.142 0.000 5.530 8.650 0.000
3 4.077 6.868 0.000 5.530 8.650 0.000
4 3.956 6.594 0.000 5.530 8.650 0.000
5 3.835 6.320 0.000 5.530 8.650 0.000
6 3.714 6.046 0.000 5.518 8.635 0.000
7 3.594 5.773 0.000 5.506 8.619 0.000
8 3.474 5.501 0.000 5.495 8.604 0.000
9 3.354 5.230 0.000 5.483 8.588 0.000
10 3.235 4.960 0.000 5.471 8.573 0.000
11 3.116 4.691 0.000 5.459 8.558 0.000
12 2.998 4.423 0.000 5.448 8.542 0.000
13 2.880 4.156 0.000 5.436 8.527 0.000
14 2.762 3.890 0.000 5.424 8.511 0.000
15 2.645 3.625 0.000 5.412 8.496 0.000
16 2.528 3.360 0.000 5.401 8.481 0.000
17 2.412 3.097 0.000 5.389 8.465 0.000
18 2.296 2.835 0.000 5.377 8.450 0.000
19 2.155 2.565 0.000 5.365 8.434 0.000
20 2.014 2.296 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
21 1.900 2.036 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
22 1.785 1.777 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
23 1.671 1.518 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
24 1.556 1.258 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
25 1.442 0.999 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
26 1.327 0.740 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
27 1.213 0.480 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
28 1.178 0.402 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
29 1.178 0.402 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
30 1.178 0.402 0.000 5.354 8.419 0.000
SUIARY OF LOSSES (% LOST)
SA FCA FPA SB FCB FPB
73.47 94.77 0.00 3.19 2.67 0.00
137
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., "The Strategy--Tactics
Relationship", in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett,
eds., Seapower and Strategy, p.59, Naval Institute Press,
1989.
2. Thomas, Clayton J., "Verification Revisited-1983", in
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed. Military Modeling, 2nd edition,
p. 262, Military Operations Research Society, 1989.
3. Hixson, John A., and Hodges, James S., "Can Combat Models
Stand up to Real Data?", unpublished paper, August 1988.
4. Campbell, John, Naval Weapons of World War Two, Conway
Maritime Press, 1985.
5. Gardiner, Robert, ed., Conway's All the World's Fighting
Ships 1906-1921, Conway Maritime Press, 1985.
6. Gardiner, Robert, ed., Conway's All the World's Fighting
Ships 1922-1946, Naval Institute Press, 1983.
7. Bennet, Geoffrey, Coronel and the Falklands, Macmillan,
1962.
8. Corbett, Sir Julian S., History of the Great War: Naval
Operations, v.1, Longmans, Green and Co., 1921.
9. Campbell, John, Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting,
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
10. Pope, Dudley, Battle of the River Plate, Naval Institute
Press, 1988.
11. Stephen, Martin, Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2,
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
12. Wilmont, H.P., The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and
Allied Strategies, February to June 1942, Naval Institute
Press, 1983.
13. Morison, Samuel E., History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II, v.4., Atlantic, Little Brown,
1948.
138
14. Dull, Paul S., A Battle History of the Im~eria. Javanese
Nay Naval Institute Press, 1978.
15. Morison, v. 5.
16. Newcomb, Richard F., Savo: The Incredible Naval Debacle
Of f Guadalcanal, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,.1961.
17. Morison, v.6.
18. Morison, v.7.
19. Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., ed. Militar~y Modeling, 2nd




Brown, Eric M., Duels in the Sky: World War II Naval
Aircraft in Combat, Naval Institute Press, 1988.
Chesneau, Roger, Aircraft Carriers of the World. 1914 to the
Present, Naval Institute Press, 1984.
Dupuy, Trevor N., Understanding War: History and Theory of
Armed Conflict, Paragon House, 1987.
Evans, David C., ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II, 2nd
edition, Naval Institute Press,1986.
Fiske, Bradley A., The Navy as a Fighting Machine, Naval
Institute Press, 1984.
Friedman, Norman, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Desiqn
History, Naval Institute Press, 1984.
Friedman, Norman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design
History, Naval Institute Press, 1982.
Goldrich, James, The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War in
the North Sea, August 1914--February 1915, Naval Institute
Press, 1984.
Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Fleet Tactics-Theory and Practice,
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Jentschura, Hansgeorg, et. al., Warships of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, Arms and Armour Press, 1977.
Marder, Arthur J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1905-1919, 5 volumes, Oxford
University Press, 1961-1970.
Rowen, Alan and Roberts, John, British Cruisers in World War
Two, Naval Institute Press, 1980.
Taylor, James G., Lanchester Models of Warfare, Military
Applications Section, Operations Research Society of America,
1983.
140
Whitley, M.J., Destroyers of World War Two: An International




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Naval Postgraduate School 2
Library Code 0142
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-03) 1
Navy Department
Washington, DC 20350-2000
4. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-816) 1
Navy Department
Washington, DC 20350-2000
5. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-81C) 1
ATTN: Mr. Robert Hallex
Navy Department
Washington, DC 20350-2000
6. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-098D) 1
ATTN: Dr. Frank Shoup
Navy Department
Washington, DC 20350-2000
7. Center for Naval Analyses 1
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302
8. Commanding Officer 1
Surface Warfare Officers School Command
Newport, RI 02841
9. Director 1
Center for Naval Warfare Studies




Surface Warfare Development Group
Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek
Norfolk, VA 23521
11. Commanding Officer 1
Tactical Training Group, Atlantic
Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic
Dam Neck
Virginia Beach, VA 23461
12. Commanding Officer 1
Tactical Training Group, Pacific
Fleet Combat Training Center, Pacific
San Diego, CA 92147
13. U.S. Naval War Colle.e
Operations Department
ATTN: Mr. Frank M. Snyder
Newport, RI 02841
14. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J8)
ATTN: Mr. Peter Burne
The Pentagon, (Room 1D940)
Washington, DC 20310
15. Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.)
President, Data Memory Systems Inc.
10392 Democracy Lane
Fairfax, VA 22030
16. Naval Surface Warfare Center (Code N12)
ATTN: Mr. Richard L. Humphrey
Silver Spring, MD 20903-5000
17. Professor Wayne P. Hughes, Code 55H1 2
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
18. CDR Thomas E. Halwachs, USN, Code 55Ha 2




19. Professor Alan R. Washburn, Code 55Ws 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
20. Professor Peter Purdue, Code 55Pd 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
21. Mr. Robert Taylor 1
Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory
Bldg 13, South 414
Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, MD 21723-6099
22. Operations Analysis Programs, Code 30 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
23. LT Thomas R. Beall 2
Class 113, SWOSCOLCOM
Department Head School
Newport, RI 02841
1
144
